Swine Flu Update

CDC can keep calling it H1N1 (as requested by the "pork growers) but I am sticking to calling it what it is as indicated above

INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (H1N1) (36): WHO UPDATE & SEASONAL
*****************************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: Fri 28 May 2010
Source: WHO Global Alert and Response (GAR) Disease Outbreak News
[summ. & edited]



Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 102
---------------------------------
As of 23 May, worldwide more than 214 countries and overseas
territories or communities have reported laboratory confirmed cases of
pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009, including over 18 114 deaths. WHO is
actively monitoring the progress of the pandemic through frequent
consultations with the WHO Regional Offices and Member States and
through monitoring of multiple sources of information.

Situation update
----------------
The most active areas of pandemic influenza virus transmission
currently are in parts of the Caribbean and Southeast Asia, where low
level circulation is occurring. Except for localized areas of pandemic
influenza activity in parts of Chile, there is little evidence of
pandemic influenza activity in the temperate zone of the southern
hemisphere.

RSV
---
Of note, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) is widely circulating in
South America resulting in an increase in respiratory disease
activity, complicating somewhat the interpretation of syndromic
surveillance data from the area. RSV primarily affects children under
the age of 5 years.

Seasonal influenza
------------------
Seasonal influenza A viruses continue to be detected at low to
sporadic levels in all regions. Influenza B has been reported in
increasing but low numbers in South America, where it only recently
appeared, while it is decreasing in Asia.

In the Caribbean and Central America, Cuba, and to a much lesser
extent Costa Rica, continue to experience active circulation of
pandemic influenza virus. In Cuba, current pandemic influenza
activity, which began during late February 2010, remains unchanged
since reaching a plateau during mid-April 2010; in addition, over the
past month, there have been sporadic detections of seasonal influenza
B viruses and also evidence of co-circulation of other respiratory
viruses. In Costa Rica, sustained low levels of pandemic influenza
virus have been co-circulating with other respiratory viruses since
the beginning of 2010. Several other countries in the region continue
to report sporadic detections of seasonal influenza B viruses and low
level co-circulation of other respiratory viruses.

In the tropical zone of South America, pandemic and seasonal influenza
viruses continued to circulate at low to sporadic levels. In Peru,
recent regional increases in respiratory diseases activity (in
children under age 5) has been largely associated with circulating
respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). In Colombia and Brazil, low levels
of pandemic and seasonal influenza H3N2 viruses have been detected
over the past month. In Bolivia, a recent period of circulation of
predominantly seasonal influenza type B viruses appears to have
concluded.

In Asia, overall pandemic influenza activity remains low to sporadic,
except in limited areas of south and southeast Asia, particularly
Singapore, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. In Singapore, levels of ARI
[acute respiratory infection] have been elevated since April 2010 and
in recent weeks have remained near epidemic threshold; approximately
39 percent of respiratory specimens from ILI [influenza-like illness]
patients tested positive for pandemic influenza virus during mid May
2010. In neighboring Malaysia, limited data suggest that active
pandemic influenza virus circulation persist after recent activity
peaked during mid April 2010; small numbers of fatal cases have been
reported since that time. In Bangladesh, co-dominant circulation of
pandemic and seasonal influenza B viruses has been observed since mid
April 2010, however, the overall intensity of respiratory diseases was
reported to low during this period. Low levels of pandemic influenza
virus continued to circulate in western India, while low and declining
levels of seasonal influenza B viruses continued to be reported across
East Asia.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, limited data from several countries continues
to suggest that active transmission of pandemic influenza virus in
West Africa has now largely subsided. In addition to the persistence
of low level circulation of pandemic influenza virus in Ghana,
sporadic detections of pandemic influenza virus have been reported
during the past month in Cameroon, Angola, and Rwanda. In Cameroon,
there has been persistent active circulation of seasonal influenza B
viruses since mid-March 2010.

In the temperate regions of the northern and southern hemisphere,
overall pandemic influenza activity remains low to sporadic. In the
southern hemisphere, Chile continues to report increased ILI in
several regions of the country (notably Los Lagos), however, the
increase in respiratory disease activity has been predominantly
associated with circulating RSV and only to a much lesser extent
pandemic influenza virus.

Viruses other than influenza
----------------------------
In neighboring Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, all recent
respiratory diseases activity during the past month has been
associated with viruses other than influenza. Similarly, there have
been no recent detections of influenza virus in South Africa. In New
Zealand and Australia, overall levels of ILI remain low; only sporadic
detections of seasonal influenza H3N2 and pandemic influenza viruses
have been recently reported in Australia.

The Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) continues monitoring
the global circulation of influenza viruses, including pandemic,
seasonal, and other influenza viruses infecting, or with the potential
to infect, humans including seasonal influenza. For more information
on virological surveillance and antiviral resistance, see the full
text of the weekly virology update at the URL above.

Oseltamivir resistance
----------------------
As of 12 May 2010, 4 additional cases of oseltamivir resistant
pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 viruses have been reported. It brings
the cumulative total to 289 so far. All but one of these have the
H275Y substitution and are assumed to remain sensitive to zanamivir.

No countries and overseas territories/communities have newly reported
their 1st pandemic (H1N1) 2009 confirmed cases since the last web
update (no. 101).

Region / Deaths*
WHO Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) / 168
WHO Regional Office for the Americas (AMRO) / At least 8401
WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO)** / 1019
WHO Regional Office for Europe (EURO) / At least 4878
WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia (SEARO) / 1814
WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific (WPRO) / 1834
Total* / At least 18114

*The reported number of fatal cases is an under representation of the
actual numbers as many deaths are never tested or recognized as
influenza related.
** No update since 7 March 2010

Since the last update on 16 May the number of fatalities has increased
by at least 17.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail Rapporteur Marianne Hopp

[The most active areas of pandemic influenza virus transmission
currently are in parts of the Caribbean and Southeast Asia
(particularly Singapore, Malaysia, and Bangladesh), where low level
circulation is occurring. Elsewhere influenza activity remains low to
sporadic, and respiratory syncytial virus and other co-circulating
respiratory viruses predominate in the tropical zone of South America.

A map of influenza activity and virus subtypes is accessible at
.
The displayed data reflect the most recent data reported to Flunet
(), WHO regional
offices, or on ministry of health websites in the preceding 2 weeks.
The full text of the WHO update should be consulted for other relevant
links. - Mod.CP]

[see also:
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (35): Singapore 20100530.1795
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (34): Indian variants 20100525.1741
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (33): WHO update, corr. 20100527.1765
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (33): WHO update 20100522.1700
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (32): WHO update 20100501.1418
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (31): UK (Scotland) D222G mut 20100422.1310
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (30): WHO update 20100417.1250
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (29): seasonal vaccine 20100415.1224
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (28): Hong Kong SAR, Norway, D222G mutation
20100409.1147
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (27): USA (GA) 20100330.1004
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (26): WHO update 20100327.0965
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (25): oseltamivir resistance 20100326.0961
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (24): mutation analysis 20100313.0820
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (23): WHO Update 20100313.0805
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (22): Canada (SK), reassortment 20100305.0734
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (21): Norway, D222G mutation 20100305.0729
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (20): China, update 20100303.0702
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (19): reassortment 20100302.0689 2009
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (18): WHO update 20100221.0587
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (17): WHO Update 20100216.0546
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (16): myocarditis in children 20100215.0526
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (15): update 20100214.0522
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (14): Finland, cross-reacting antibody 20100205.0392
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (13): vaccine recall 20100204.0379
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (12): vaccine distribution, WHO update 20100202.0359
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (11): WHO statement to CE, corr. 20100129.0312
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (11): WHO statement to CE 20100126.0289
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (10): PAHO update 20100121.0240
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (09): WHO update 20100119.0221
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (08): USA (vaccine safety), Mongolia 20100117.0194
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (07): China, travel alert 20100115.0180
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (06): USA (SD) Native Americans 20100114.0160
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (05): vaccine update 20100112.0143
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (04): Australia (WA), i/v zanamivir 20100111.0127
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (03): USA (WI) minorities 20100109.0103
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (02): PAHO update 20100108.0093
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (01): China, 2009 20100105.0040]
........................................cp/mj/jw
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VESICULAR STOMATITIS, EQUINE - USA: (ARIZONA)

*********************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: 28 May 2010
Source: Arizona Department of Agriculture press release [edited]



Vesicular Stomatitis Virus Found In Horses in Arizona
-----------------------------------------------------
The Arizona Department of Agriculture has confirmed Vesicular
Stomatitis Virus (VSV) in horses on a premises in Cochise County. The
case-positive premises where VSV was discovered has been quarantined.
This disease causes blister-like lesions to form in the mouth and on
the dental pad, tongue, lips, nostrils, hooves, and teats. These
blisters swell and break, leaving raw tissue that is so painful that
infected animals generally refuse to eat or drink and show signs of
lameness. Severe weight loss usually follows, and in dairy cows, a
severe drop in milk production commonly occurs. Affected dairy cattle
can appear to be normal and will continue to eat about half of their
feed intake.

Why is this important?

While vesicular stomatitis can cause economic losses to livestock
producers, it is a particularly significant disease because its
outward signs are similar to (although generally less severe than)
those of foot-and-mouth disease, a foreign animal disease of
cloven-hoofed animals that was eradicated from the United States in
1929. The clinical signs of vesicular stomatitis are also similar to
those of swine vesicular disease, another foreign animal disease. The
only way to tell these diseases apart is through laboratory tests.

Can humans "get it?"

Humans can also become infected with vesicular stomatitis when
handling affected animals. However, we have no human cases to report.

Which animals are most susceptible?

Horses, swine and cattle are most at risk. However, other animals may
also contract the disease.

Has this disease been found in the U.S. before?

Last year [2009] Texas and New Mexico had a few cases of VSV. This
year Arizona is the 1st state to detect the disease, which occurs
sporadically on 5 to 8 year cycles.

Why is this occurring now?

Vesicular stomatitis is most likely to occur during warm months in
the Southwest, particularly along riverways and in valleys. Arizona
last had confirmed cases of VSV in the spring of 2005.

How is this disease handled?

The following actions have been recommended to the owners of the horses:
. This report was primarily compiled from
.

- Separate animals with lesions from healthy animals, preferably by
stabling. Animals on pastures apparently are affected more frequently
with this disease.

- As a precautionary measure, do not move animals from premises
affected by vesicular stomatitis for at least 30 days after the last
lesion found has healed.

- Implement on-farm insect control programs that include the
elimination or reduction of insect breeding areas and the use of
insecticide sprays or insecticide-treated eartags on animals.

- Use protective measures when handling affected animals to avoid
human exposure to this disease.

What if a viewer/reader suspects they have animal(s) with this problem?

They should immediately contact their veterinarian or the State
Veterinarian's office.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


[Vesicular stomatitis virus is one of those interesting diseases that
emerges every once in a while without much warning until it bursts
uninvited into our livestock population. It does not occur every
year, but in the past several years it has been almost yearly.

The problem with vesicular stomatitis is twofold. One, there is
inevitably a disruption of production in cattle; not only will the
sick animal produce less, but disease management tactics must be
very stringent. The 2nd problem is that the clinical signs are
similar to that of foot and mouth disease (FMD), with which it can
easily be confused (though horses are resistant to FMD and
susceptible to VS).

In this case, the diagnosis of the disease in an equine 1st
forestalls any worry about FMD, until an animal susceptible to FMD,
such as a bovine, appears with similar clinical signs. Consequently,
surveillance must be ever vigilant.

VS can be transmitted by contamination by transcutaneous or
transmucosal route and by arthropod transmission (_Phlebotomus_, and
_Aedes_, etc.). Incubation of the disease may be as long as 21 days.

According to the OIE, clinical signs can be summarized as follows:

- excessive salivation

- blanched raised or broken vesicles of various sizes in the mouth:

Horses: upper surface of the tongue, surface of the lips and around
nostrils, corners of the mouth and the gums

Cattle: tongue, lips, gums, hard palate, and sometimes muzzle and
around the nostrils

Pigs: snout:

- Lesions involving feet of horses and cattle are not exceptional

- Teat lesions occur in dairy herds

- Foot lesions and lameness are frequent in pigs

- Recovery in around 2 weeks

- Complication: loss of production and mastitis in dairy herds due
to secondary infections, lameness in horses

There are 2 major serotypes: New Jersey, and Indiana. We would like
to know which of the 2 strains this one is.

Portions of this comment have been extracted from:
- Mod.TG]

[The interactive HealthMap/ProMED map for Arizona is available at:
- CopyEd.EJP]

[see also:
2009
----
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - USA (03): (NM) 20090623.2294
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - USA (02): (TX) 20090616.2230
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - USA: (TX) 20090613.2188
2007
----
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - Belize (Cayo): OIE 20070319.0967
2006
----
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - USA (WY)(02): OIE 20060825.2395
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - USA (WY) 20060818.2314]
....................tg/ejp/lm

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ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
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thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
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or archived material.
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BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS, BOVINE - USA (04): (KENTUCKY)

[see also:
I am not sure why Tam included
Tuberculosis, XXDR - USA: FL ex Peru 20091230.4387 but I left it.

Maria
===

Bovine tuberculosis - USA: (KY)

BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS - USA: (KENTUCKY)
*************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: Wed 26 May 2010
Source: CNBC, Associated Press (AP) report [edited]



Two beef cattle in Kentucky have tested positive for bovine
tuberculosis, and state veterinarian Robert Stout says results are
pending on a 3rd animal.

Stout said [Wed 26 May 2010] that the 2 infected cows were in a
Fleming County herd in northern Kentucky, but he said the 3 animals
didn't enter the food supply.

He said the disease was discovered when a cow from the farm was
slaughtered in Pennsylvania and tested positive. Stout said the rest
of the herd was tested, and 2 other cattle were suspected of having
the disease. One tested positive for the disease.

Stout said Kentucky has been classified as free of bovine
tuberculosis since 1987. He said that status would likely not change
if no other animals test positive in the next 6 months.

Bovine tuberculosis causes severe coughing, fatigue, emaciation, and
debilitation in cattle and results in reduced milk and meat
production.

Humans can catch the disease from contact with infected cattle, but
that's rare.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


[Bovine tuberculosis (TB) is caused by _Mycobacterium bovis_. While
there are other _Mycobacterium_ spp, _M. bovis_ and _M. tuberculosis_
are among the most important, as these tend to move between animals
and people.

Disease caused by mycobacteria often develop very slowly and may take
months to years to develop. These bacteria grow very slowly and only
replicate every 12-20 hours. While the pathogenic species (those
which can cause disease) such as _M. tuberculosis_ and _M. bovis_ can
infect a human or an animal, often the individual does not know that
he has been infected. In humans, those infected but without active
disease can be treated to prevent disease from occurring. To prevent
other animals from being infected, a diseased animal must be culled
from the herd.

The disease primarily affects the respiratory tract but can also
spread to other parts of the body. The primary route of transmission
is the exchange of respiratory secretions between infected and
uninfected animals. This can be achieved through nose-to-nose contact
or by the inhalation of aerosol droplets that have been exhaled by an
infected animal. Animals may also become infected with _M. bovis_ by
ingesting the bacteria. This could occur by ingesting feeds that have
been contaminated with _M. bovis_ by other infected animals.
Carnivores may become infected with bovine TB by eating infected
carcasses.

Various factors affect the efficiency in which _M. bovis_ is spread
within a cattle herd. The number of infected animals shedding the
organism, as well as the number of susceptible animals present within
a herd can have an impact on the transmission of the bacteria. For
example, the more animals within a herd that are shedding _M. bovis_,
the greater the chance of an uninfected animal coming into contact
with an infected animal. The animal density of a herd also influences
the efficiency of _M. bovis_ transmission. Transmission of _M. bovis_
among animals housed in confinement facilities may be greater because
of close contact. Cattle infected with bovine TB may shed bacteria in
their feces, urine and milk, but these are felt to be a minor source
of bacterial transmission.

Environmental contamination with _M. bovis_ may play a role in the
spread of bovine TB. Survival of _M. bovis_ in the environment is
primarily affected by exposure to sunlight. Reports on the length of
survival of _M. bovis_ vary from 18-332 days at temperatures ranging
from 54-75 deg F (12-24 deg C). Under laboratory conditions, _M.
bovis_ has been isolated for up to 8 weeks from various feeds kept at
75 deg F (24 deg C) and 14 weeks from various feeds kept at 32 deg F
(0 deg C). However, under field conditions, it is difficult to
isolate _M. bovis_ from pastures grazed by animals known to be
infected with bovine TB.

Kentucky will be tracing all animals having moved into the herd of
origin (trace-ins) as well all animals that have moved out of the
herd of origin (trace-outs). If they find more animals that are not
related to this herd, there free status may be in jeopardy.

Portions of this comment have been extracted from
.
- Mod.TG]

[The state of Kentucky in the East Central US can be located on the
HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map at
.
Fleming County can be located on the map at
. - Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]

[see also:
Bovine tuberculosis, cervid - USA: (MI) 20100418.1265
Bovine tuberculosis, bovine - USA (03): (NE) 20100409.1144
Bovine tuberculosis, bovine - USA (02): (MI) 20100325.0948
Bovine tuberculosis, bovine - USA: (SD) 20100107.0065
2009
----
Tuberculosis, XXDR - USA: FL ex Peru 20091230.4387
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (12): (MN), cervid 20091222.4315
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (11): (IN) cervid 20090804.2742
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (10): (IN) cervid, bovine 20090714.2508
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (09): (IN) cervid, bovine 20090711.2480
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (08): (IN) cervid, bovine 20090628.2343
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (07): (MN) cervid 20090625.2307
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (06) (NE) (02) 20090620.2270
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (05): (NE) 20090613.2198
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (04): (TX) conf. 20090613.2195
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (03): (NE) cattle, elk 20090603.2060
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (02): (ND) 20090514.1811
Bovine tuberculosis - USA: (TX), susp 20090423.1536
Tuberculosis, captive wildlife - USA: (NE) 20090414.1423
Tuberculosis, hospital exposures - USA: (IL) susp. 20090412.1398]
...................................sb/tg/mj/lm
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ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
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information, and of any statements or opinions based
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BRUCELLOSIS, BOVINE - CANADA (02): (BRITISH COLUMBIA), CLARIFICATION

********************************************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: 28 Jun 2010
From: Maria Koller

The following important points of correction and clarification are
being provided in relation to the subject posting.

Brucellosis has NOT been detected in the 3 BC-origin cows that were
slaughtered in the US, nor in the 2 cattle herds in southern BC from
which these 3 cows originated. At this time, brucellosis is suspected
but it is NOT detected or confirmed.

The 2 slaughtered cows were classified as reactors on serological
tests for brucellosis, meaning their status is brucellosis-suspect.
The remaining serum samples from these cows (no tissue samples were
taken) have been sent to the World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE) reference laboratory for brucellosis which is located in the
Canadian Food Inspection Agency's (CFIA) laboratory in Ottawa. Here,
additional laboratory investigations are being carried out on these
samples in order to further characterize the nature and cause of the
serological test results obtained in the US.

The 2 herds from which the 3 suspect cows originated are quarantined
while further investigations, including whole herd tests, are carried
out in these herds. The purpose of these investigations is to
ascertain the true infection status of these herds 'and to establish
the absence or presence of brucellosis. An essential element of these
investigations is a thorough examination of all possible routes by
which these herds could have been exposed to _Brucella abortus_,
including all trace-ins to these herds. Cattle removed from the herds
(trace-outs) are being identified.

These 2 cattle herds are located very close to one another in
southern BC and at a considerable distance from any known reservoirs
of _B. abortus_ infection; and at an even greater distance from known
reservoirs of _Brucella. suis_ infection (which could cause the
observed reactions). Canada has not practiced vaccination for
brucellosis for more than a decade; and import controls are in place
to prevent the introduction of the disease from other countries.

Although the last confirmed case of brucellosis in cattle in Canada
occurred more than 20 years ago, Canada has maintained a high level
of vigilance for this disease. Robust surveillance programs for
brucellosis have remained in place. These programs detect a small
number of brucellosis suspect reactor cattle, not unlike these three
cows, each year. Every finding of a suspect reactor under these
programs has triggered a comprehensive trace-back investigation of
all herds associated with the reactor animal, similar to the
investigations being undertaken for these three reactor cows. Since
1989, each and every one of these investigations has confirmed the
absence of brucellosis infection in these herds and in Canadian
livestock.

The investigations into these 3 suspect reactor cows are being
undertaken with the same diligence and thoroughness as is employed
for all suspect brucellosis investigations in Canada. The laboratory
tests and field investigations that are required to definitively
answer the question "has brucellosis been found in Canada?" are being
carried out as expeditiously as possible. I would be pleased to
provide an update once we have the answer.

--
Maria A. B. Koller-Jones, D.V.M.
Senior Staff Veterinarian
Animal Health Directorate
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
1400 Merivale Road, Ottawa, ON, K1A 0Y9

Government of Canada



[ProMED-mail is grateful for Dr. Koller-Jones providing this timely
and thorough correction to the media report cited in our last post.
Also we would gratefully appreciate the update that she has offered
to provide. - Mod.TG]

[see also:
Brucellosis, bovine - Canada: (BC) 20100528.1769]

..................tg/lm
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USDA Issues Pre-Harvest Management Controls & Intervention Options for Reducing Ecoli Shedding in Cattle

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Reducing_Ecoli_Shedding_In_Cattle_0510.pdf

The 5th Plague: Mock Ag-Bioterrorism Attack Conference

Case Western Reserve University Law School terrorism bioterrorism emergency response biosecurity cox international center

Presented by: Frederick K. Cox International Law Center
Cosponsored by: Institute for Global Security Law and Policy
The Law-Medicine Center


Summary: The Fifth Plague is a unique simulation-based bioterrorism conference. Participants, who include local, state, national and international officials, will be asked to "role play" their response to an agricultural-based attack. Issues that will be addressed include: legal questions of authority and powers of various agencies; cooperation among different branches of the government and between the U.S. and Canada; and responses to an actual attack. Attorneys who attend the event will learn about the law and procedures related to responding to a terrorist crisis in Ohio, specifically involving the food supply, enabling them to advise clients in the agriculture and transportation sectors and to prepare for potential litigation in this area.

Category: Education
Tags:zootonic diseases, agriculture, bioterrorism, world health, national security


Pt.1; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fnijoZrYX9g&feature=channel

Pt.2; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBrooscAreg

Pt. 3; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qr1DNNSUmHw

USDA "Casting" for Answers for Sustainable Ag - Invites US to Join in the Fray

Sustaining Animal Agriculture: Balancing Bioethical, Economic, and Social Issues

Where:Jefferson Auditorium
South Agriculture Building
1400 Independence Ave. SW
Washington, DC 20250-3700



When:
June 08, 2010 at noon
-to-
June 10, 2010 at 3:00 PM


The Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST), in cooperation with the USDA, is hosting a symposium of more than 30 speakers and panelists to address the impacts of regulations on food-animal agriculture at all levels and analyze the intended and unintended consequences of those regulations. This free symposium will be held in Washington, D.C., June 8-10, 2010. Don't miss out on this opportunity to hear the critical issues and get involved!

Symposium speakers and panelists will focus on several critical issues, including
Integration of Competing Concepts Surrounding the Ethical Use of Food Animals
Bioethical and Animal Welfare Issues
Long-term Survival and Food Security
Analysis of Certification and Regulatory Programs
Societal and Global Impacts
Consequences of Decisions by Consumers and Government Decision Makers
The symposium is free, but seating is limited and registration is highly recommended. Even if you are only able to attend part of the symposium, we encourage pre-registration for your convenience to get through the security and registration process as quickly as possible. On-site registration will also be available.

Click on the Register Now! link below to view the event homepage where you can pre-register and get a detailed agenda including speakers, dates, and times of each topic.

Register Now!

If you should have any questions about the event, sponsorship, or registration, please contact CAST at msly@cast-science.org or (515) 292-2125.

Thank you for your attention and response. We look forward to seeing you at this event.

Sincerely,
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology
msly@cast-science.org
515 292 2125

National Scrapie Eradication Program

How are we doing on that? Not so good, eh?

What it is; http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/

What it looks like;

Narrated Videos in link above

BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS - UK: (ENGLAND), WILD BOAR

**********************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: Fri 21 May 2010
Source: Farmer's Weekly Interactive [edited]



Bovine TB found in feral wild boar
----------------------------------
Bovine tuberculosis (TB) has spread to Britain's feral wild boar
population, DEFRA has announced. Tests on a 60kg [132 pounds] female
boar in Herefordshire revealed tissue lesions consistent with the disease.

The boar was trapped as part of a research project which was being
carried about by the Food and Environment Research Agency. The animal
died while under anaesthetic and was sent for post-mortem where the
disease was identified.

A DEFRA spokesman said that the incident did not change the
department's risk assessment for the disease. "The risk to domestic
livestock, wild animals and public health from _M bovis_ infection in
wild boar remains low and this isolated incident does not alter our
assessment. The main risk of human _M bovis_ infection arising from
wild boar is probably occupational, for those handling live infected
animals or their carcasses in the field."

The wild boar joins the growing list of non-bovine hosts for the
disease. The disease has been found in farmed wild boar twice while
cases in cats, dogs, pigs and camelids, although still low, appear to
be increasing.

Fewer than 1 percent of human TB cases are thought to be linked to
bovine TB infections.

[Byline: Jonathan Riley]

--
Communicated by:
Andrea Jones
All About Resources, Shropshire, SY95AJ


[A previous TB case in a wild boar from Herefordshire was described
in posting 20100319.0879. It related to 'lesions consistent with TB'
in a boar from the Ross-on-Wye area. Or was that the same animal?!. - Mod.AS]

[see also:
Bovine tuberculosis - UK: (England) sheep 20100319.0879
2009
----
Bovine tuberculosis, porcine - New Zealand: (N Island) 20091104.3805
2005
----
Tuberculosis, wild boars - Spain (03) 20050712.1976
Tuberculosis, wild boars - Spain (02) 20050709.1955
Tuberculosis, wild boars - Spain 20050707.1923]
....................arn/ejp/mpp

*##########################################################*
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CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE, CERVIDS - USA (09): (SOUTH DAKOTA)

Caught from domestic cattle or from "farmed" cervids for those "canned hunting" places?

***********************************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: Thu 20 May 2010
Source: KCAUTV, Associated Press (AP) report [edited]



The state's [South Dakota] wildlife division confirmed another 25
cases of chronic wasting disease in deer and elk during the latest
testing period.

The disease attacks the brains of infected animals and is always
fatal. The Game, Fish and Parks Department [GFP] tests for the
disease in samples provided by hunters and in sick animals observed
in the wild.

The state tested 1823 samples from last July [2009] through January
this year [2010]. [See comment below. - Mod.MHJ]

The state has found 136 cases of chronic wasting disease since
testing began in 1997. All infected animals have come from Custer,
Fall River, and Pennington counties in the southwest corner of the state.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


[Actually if you go to SD GFP 'Latest chronic wasting disease testing
results" at
,
you will see that the 1823 samples cover from 1 Jul 2009 through 30
Apr 2010, and involved 402 elk samples (6 positive), 476 mule deer (8
positive), 989 white-tailed deer (13 positive), and 1 moose (0
positive). These positives have yet to be mapped.

However there are 2 excellent historic maps listed on their chronic
wasting disease page at
,
namely:
Map of CWD positives in Southwestern SD July 2008-May 2009

and
Black Hills view of Positive CWD cases in South Dakota, 2001-May 2009
.

South Dakota GFP is to be commended on its transparency and openness.
- Mod.MHJ]

[The state of South Dakota in the Midwestern US can be located on the
HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map at
. The counties mentioned can be seen on
the map of the state at
. -
Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]

[see also:
2007
----
Chronic wasting disease, cervids - USA: (02) (SD), 2007 20080218.0653
2006
----
Chronic wasting disease, cervids - USA (SD) 20060616.1669
2003
----
Chronic wasting disease, cervids - USA (SD) (03) 20030725.1822
Chronic wasting disease, cervids, 2002 - USA (SD) (02) 20030313.0622
Chronic wasting disease, cervids, 2002 - USA (SD) 20030203.0293
2002
----
Chronic wasting disease, cervids - USA (SD) (04) 20021120.5855
Chronic wasting disease, cervids - USA (SD) (03) 20020827.5162
Chronic wasting disease, cervids - USA (SD) (02) 20020820.5099
Chronic wasting disease, cervids - USA (SD) 20020304.3679]
...................................mhj/mj/mpp

EQUINE RHINOPNEUMONITIS - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: (DUBAI) OIE

***********************************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: Thu 20 May 2010
Source: OIE, WAHID (World Animal Health Information Database), weekly
disease information 2010; 23(20) [edited]



Equine rhinopneumonitis, United Arab Emirates
---------------------------------------------
Information received on (and dated) 20 May 2010 from Eng Sumaia Al
Rais, Head of Animal and Plant Health, Animal and Plant Health
Department, Ministry of Environment and Water, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Summary
Report type: immediate notification (final report)
Start date: 28 Mar 2010
Date of first confirmation of the event: 7 Apr 2010
Report date: 20 May 2010
Date submitted to OIE: 20 May 2010
Date event resolved: 28 Mar 2010
Reason for notification: reoccurrence of a listed disease
Date of previous occurrence: 2000
Manifestation of disease: clinical disease
Causal agent: Equid herpesvirus-1
Nature of diagnosis: suspicion, clinical, laboratory (basic)
This event pertains to a defined zone within the country

New outbreaks
Summary of outbreaks
Total outbreaks: 1
Location: AlQuoz, Dubai, Dubai, Dubayy
Date of start of the outbreak: 28 Mar 2010
Outbreak status: resolved (28 Mar 2010)
Epidemiological unit: farm
Species: Equidae
Susceptible: 3
Cases: 1
Deaths: 1
Destroyed: 0
Slaughtered: 0

Epidemiology
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive
Epidemiological comments: an abortion in an Arabian breeding stock
was reported on 28 Mar 2010. The mare foaled one week earlier with
premature placental separation. The foal was born alive but died
within a few minutes without the lungs inflating. The virus was
isolated from placenta, liver, spleen, lung, and tonsil. The mare had
been vaccinated at 5, 7, and 9 months of gestation.

Control measures
Measures applied: no vaccination; no treatment of affected animals
Measures to be applied: no other measures

Diagnostic test results
Laboratory name and type: Central Veterinary Research Laboratory,
Dubai (national laboratory)
Species: Equidae
Test: indirect fluorescent antibody (IFA) test
Test date: 7 Apr 2010
Result: positive

Species: Equidae
Test: virus isolation
Test date: 7 Apr 2010
Result: positive

Future reporting
The event is resolved. No more reports will be submitted.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


[The following summary is from the OIE Terrestrial Manual 2008.

Equine rhinopneumonitis (ER) is a collective term for any one of
several highly contagious, clinical disease entities of equids that
may occur as a result of infection by either of 2 closely related
herpesviruses, equid herpesvirus-1 and -4 (EHV-1 and EHV-4).
Infection by either EHV-1 or EHV-4 is characterised by a primary
respiratory tract disease of varying severity that is related to the
age and immunological status of the infected animal. Infections by
EHV-1 in particular are capable of progression beyond the respiratory
mucosa to cause the more serious disease manifestations of abortion,
perinatal foal death, or neurological dysfunction.

ER is highly contagious among susceptible horses, with viral
transmission to cohort animals occurring by inhalation of aerosols of
virus-laden respiratory secretions. Extensive use of vaccines has not
eliminated EHV infections, and the worldwide annual financial burden
from these equine pathogens is immense.

In horses under 3 years of age, clinical ER usually takes the form of
an acute, febrile respiratory illness that spreads rapidly through
the group of animals. The viruses infect and multiply in epithelial
cells of the respiratory mucosa. Signs of infection become apparent
2-8 days after exposure to virus, and are characterised by fever,
inappetence, depression, and nasal discharge. The severity of
respiratory disease varies with the age of the horse and the level of
immunity resulting from previous vaccination or natural exposure.
Subclinical infections with EHV-1/4 are common, even in young
animals. Although mortality from uncomplicated ER is rare and
complete recovery within 1-2 weeks is the normal pattern, the
respiratory infection is a frequent and significant cause of
interrupted schedules among horses assembled for training, racing, or
competitive equestrian events. Fully protective immunity resulting
from infection is of short duration, and convalescent animals are
susceptible to reinfection by EHV-1/4 after several months. Although
reinfections by the 2 herpesviruses cause less severe or clinically
inapparent respiratory disease, the risks of subsequent abortion
and/or central nervous system (CNS) disease are not eliminated. The
greatest clinical threats to individual breeding, racing, or pleasure
horse operations posed by ER are the potential abortigenic and
neurological sequelae of EHV-1 respiratory infection.

For further information please see
.
Also, Dr. Luce's comments on terminology in ProMED-mail Equine
herpesvirus - USA (MI) (02) 20041221.3364 are educational. - Mod.PC]

[AlQuoz is located in western Dubai. The HealthMap/ProMED-mail
interactive map of the United Arab Emirates is available at
. - Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]

[see also:
Equine rhinopneumonitis - Israel: OIE 20050803.2258
2004
------
Equine herpesvirus - USA (MI)(02) 20041221.3364
Equine herpesvirus - USA (MI) 20041219.3349
Equine herpesvirus type 1 - USA (MD) 20040709.1843
2003
----
Equine herpesvirus type 1, diagnosis (02) 20031110.2785
Equine herpesvirus type 1 - UK (02) 20030412.0894
Equine herpesvirus type 1 - UK 20030323.0719
Equine herpesvirus - USA (KY) (02) 20030320.0697
Equine herpesvirus - USA (Ohio): suspected (02) 20030124.0218]
...................................pc/mj/mpp

HENDRA VIRUS, EQUINE - AUSTRALIA: (QUEENSLAND)

**********************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: 20 May 2010
Source: ABC News, Australia [edited]



Horse dies from Hendra virus
----------------------------
A horse has died in another outbreak of the hendra virus in
Queensland. It has been confirmed a horse has been put down at
Tewantin on the Sunshine Coast after falling ill on Monday [17 May
2010]. Queensland Health (QH) says there is no indication any of the
people on the property have contracted the virus.

Chief veterinary officer Dr Ron Glanville told reporters up to 7
people could have been in contact with the horse before it died. He
said the property owner noticed the horse's condition on Monday
morning and a vet, wearing protective equipment due to his suspicion
of hendra virus, examined the horse.

Dr Glanville said there was a bat colony in the area. The natural
host for hendra virus in Australia is the flying fox, but it is not
clear how horses become infected.

A horse lives on the adjoining property but is not believed to be under threat.

Queensland Horse Council president Debbie Dekker said most people
believed the misconception that the hendra virus was seasonal,
coinciding with the flying fox breeding season between June and
August, because previous hendra outbreaks occurred during that time.
"We are fearful people get complacent because they think the hendra
virus is seasonal, but this is proof that this is not the case," she said.

"The fact is we don't know what the stresses are to cause bats to
shed the virus. It's circulating in bats at all times which means it
can happen anytime."

To date 4 people have died out of 7 who contracted the virus in Queensland.

--
Communicated by:
Dr Alexandra Volosinas


[It should be quickly pointed out that at this time no people in the
area are ill. - Mod.MHJ]

["Hendra virus (formerly called equine morbillivirus) is a member of
the family _Paramyxoviridae_. The virus was 1st isolated in 1994 from
specimens obtained during an outbreak of respiratory and neurologic
disease in horses and humans in Hendra, a suburb of Brisbane,
Australia. The natural reservoir for Hendra virus is thought to be
flying foxes (bats of the genus _Pteropus_) found in
Australia. Hendra virus does not transmit readily between animals
other than flying foxes.

"Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) research has shown that
horses, cats and guinea pigs can excrete virus in their urine. Hendra
virus has been transmitted to people through close contact with
infected horses or their body fluids. To date, no human-to-human
transmission of Hendra virus has been documented.

"Horses are the only species of domestic animal that can be naturally
infected with Hendra virus. Infections in horses range from
asymptomatic infection to fatal respiratory and neurological
syndromes. For fatal cases, the course of illness takes an average of two days.

"Symptoms of Hendra virus infection in horses are not dramatically
different from other respiratory and neurological illnesses of
horses. Hendra should be suspected if there is also the proximity of
bats, or the presence of human cases of acute respiratory distress
syndrome or encephalitis. Generally Hendra virus outbreaks in horses
occur one to 2 weeks before illness in humans; detected outbreaks in
horses could trigger prevention measures to deter associated
outbreaks in humans.

"The incubation period (interval from infection to onset of symptoms)
in horses varies between 5 and 16 days. The case fatality rate in
horses is about 75 percent.

"Spill-over of Hendra virus from fruit bats to horses is rare. The
transmission route is likely through contamination of pasture or feed
by infected birthing fluids or fetal tissues from bats.

"There have also been 13 clusters of Hendra virus infection recorded
in horses since the virus was 1st identified.

"Human infections with Hendra virus range from mild influenza-like
illness to fatal respiratory or neurological disease. Infected people
initially develop fever, headaches, myalgia (muscle pain), sore
throat and a dry cough. They have also have enlarged lymph nodes,
lethargy and vertigo.

"The incubation period (interval from infection to onset of symptoms)
ranges from 5 to 14 days. To date, there have been 7 confirmed human
cases including 4 deaths."

(the above information is a composite of information cited from the
CDC website
, the
CSIRO website
and the
WHO website
). - Mod.MPP]

[see also:
Hendra virus, swine vector potential 20100203.0366
2009
----
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (05): (QL) 20090910.3189
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (04): (QL) fatal 20090903.3098
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (03): (QL) 20090830.3052
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (02): (QL) 20090826.2998
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia: (QL) 20090821.2963
Hendra virus, equine - Australia (02): (QL), RFI 20090820.2943
Hendra virus, equine - Australia: (QL) 20090811.2862
2008
----
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (07): (QLD) 20080821.2606
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (06): (QLD) 20080820.2592
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (05): (QLD) 20080816.2548
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (04): (QLD) 20080725.2260
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (03): (QLD) 20080720.2201
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (02): (QLD,NSW) 20080717.2168
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia: (QLD) 20080715.2146
2007
----
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (QLD) (04): 2nd corr. 20070903.2903
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (QLD) (04): 2nd corr. 20070903.2902
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (QLD) (03): corr. 20070903.2897
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (QLD) (03): corr. 20070903.2896
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (QLD) (02): not 20070831.2871
Hendra virus, human, equine - Australia (QLD): RFI 20070830.2851
2004
----
Hendra virus - Australia (QLD) 20041214.3307]
..........................mpp/mhj/ejp/mpp

*##########################################################*

Word from the White House: Symposium on Food "Security" Today

Subject: Secretary Vilsack Gives Keynote
Secretary Vilsack will be giving a keynote speech at the Symposium on Global Agriculture and Food Security today at 12:00pm.

Watch it streamed live at https://statedept.connectsolutions.com/foodsecurity


USDA White House Liaison Office
1400 Independence Ave, SW
Room 507-A, Whitten Building
Washington, D.C. 20250
Office: 202/720-2406
Fax: 202/720-9286

Cargill Kills & USDA Covers it Up

USDA Offical Says, "Must "balance" Meat-Industry Interest with that of Consumer Safety!" What? We dont come first?

See quote, Dr. Peterson, FSIS / USDA; http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10446

See also: Cargill Kills; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04/health/04meat.html?_r=2

BOTULISM, EQUINE - USA: (TENNESSEE)

BOTULISM, EQUINE - USA: (TENNESSEE)
***********************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: Tue 18 May 2010
Source: The Tennessean [edited]



Four horses at Spring Hill stables die from botulism and 6 more are
hospitalized
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Many in the area have experienced tough times recently, and Spirit
Horse Stables is no exception. In fact, the business has gone through
the worst tragedy in its history. The Spring Hill riding stables lost
4 of its horses to a rare form of botulism poisoning last week [week
of 10 May 2010] and another 6 are hospitalized. "I can't even tell
you how absolutely devastated we are," manager Nancy Haines said.
"These horses were and are greatly loved. Some of them the owners had
since we opened in 1996."

The often-lethal botulism is the result of bacteria in decaying
matter. The horses can be infected through a cut or by ingesting even
a small amount of the toxin.

Although the cause of the Spirit Horse infections hasn't been
determined at this point, Haines believes the bacteria grew in wet
hay the horses ate, perhaps due to the recent floods. The property
drained well but still got very wet.

[The owners] had never had an animal come down with the illness since
the stable's founding.

"The bacteria grow in areas where it doesn't dry out and where there
is a great amount of protection from the air," said DeWayne Perry,
the county's agriculture extension officer [that is, its growth is
anaerobic. - Mod.MHJ] In the past, cases have been documented where a
horse had gnawed on a hunk of feed that was compacted in the bottom
of a feeding trough or where a tightly rolled bale of hay hid a
festering contaminant such as a dead snake or rabbit.

The horses at the stables which didn't make it include Kat's Meow, a
paint pony who started as a rescue case; Chica, a quarter horse mare
who was good for beginning riders; Minx, the stable's best show pony;
and Ever, a gelding pony who used to follow his little girl owner
around "like a little puppy dog," Haines said.

A vaccine is available for the illness, but it's fairly rare so vets
often don't recommend it for a regular course of inoculations, except
for at-risk horses. The other 11 horses that remain at the Spirit
Horse Stables have all just recently received the vaccine. "We just
can't lose any more horses," Haines said.

[Byline: Bonnie Burch]

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


[Treating horses for this condition is not cheap and this riding
stable is suffering financially as a result. Presumably the horses
were fed a contaminated batch of hay. If that is the case and it is
May, the horses do not have access to pasture. I refer members
needing to know more about this condition to read the previous
ProMED-mail posting 20100408.1129.

To find (this) Spring Hill -- it is a common town name in Tennessee
-- go to .
The HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of the state is available
at . - Mod.MHJ]

[see also:
Botulism, equine, bovine - USA (02): (WI), RFI 20100408.1129
Botulism, equine, bovine - USA: (WI) 20100404.1084
2009
----
Botulism, equine - USA: (WY) 20090502.1651]
...................................mhj/mj/mpp

*##########################################################*
************************************************************
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
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The Vulgar Truth About U.S. Meat

A well-respected physicians POV;

http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2010/05/18/american-meat-is-even-more-disgusting-than-you-thought.aspx

Study suggests processed meat a real health risk : AMI Disputes

By Julie Steenhuysen Julie Steenhuysen – Mon May 17, 6:23 pm ET
CHICAGO (Reuters) – Eating bacon, sausage, hot dogs and other processed meats can raise the risk of heart disease and diabetes, U.S. researchers said on Monday in a study that identifies the real bad boys of the meat counter.

Eating unprocessed beef, pork or lamb appeared not to raise risks of heart attacks and diabetes, they said, suggesting that salt and chemical preservatives may be the real cause of these two health problems associated with eating meat.

The study, an analysis of other research called a meta-analysis, did not look at high blood pressure or cancer, which are also linked with high meat consumption.

"To lower risk of heart attacks and diabetes, people should consider which types of meats they are eating," said Renata Micha of the Harvard School of Public Health, whose study appears in the journal Circulation.

"Processed meats such as bacon, salami, sausages, hot dogs and processed deli meats may be the most important to avoid," Micha said in a statement.

Based on her findings, she said people who eat one serving per week or less of processed meats have less of a risk.

The American Meat Institute objected to the findings, saying it was only one study and that it stands in contrast to other studies and the U.S. Dietary Guidelines for Americans.

"At best, this hypothesis merits further study. It is certainly no reason for dietary changes," James Hodges, president of the American Meat Institute, said in a statement.

Most dietary guidelines recommend eating less meat. Individual studies looking at relationships between eating meat and cardiovascular diseases and diabetes have had mixed results.

But studies rarely look for differences in risk between processed and unprocessed red meats, Micha said.

She and colleagues did a systematic review of nearly 1,600 studies from around the world looking for evidence of a link between eating processed and unprocessed red meat and the risk of heart disease and diabetes.

They defined processed meat as any meat preserved by smoking, curing or salting, or with the addition of chemical preservatives. Meats in this category included bacon, salami, sausages, hot dogs or processed deli or luncheon meats.

Unprocessed red meat included beef, lamb or pork but not poultry.

They found that on average, each 1.8 oz (50 grams) daily serving of processed meat a day -- one to two slices of deli meats or one hot dog -- was associated with a 42 percent higher risk of heart disease and a 19 percent higher risk of developing diabetes.

They found no higher heart or diabetes risk in people who ate only unprocessed red meats.

The team adjusted for a number of factors, including how much meat people ate. They said lifestyle factors were similar between those who ate processed and unprocessed meats.

"When we looked at average nutrients in unprocessed red and processed meats eaten in the United States, we found that they contained similar average amounts of saturated fat and cholesterol," Micha said.

"In contrast, processed meats contained, on average, four times more sodium and 50 percent more nitrate preservatives," Micha added.

Last month, the Institute of Medicine urged the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to regulate the amount of salt added to foods to help Americans cut their high sodium intake.

The FDA has not yet said whether it will regulate salt in foods, but it is looking at the issue.


http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100517/hl_nm/us_heart_meat

UNDIAGNOSED RESPIRATORY DISEASE, EQUINE - ICELAND: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

My guess, equine TB; http://old.vri.cz/docs/vetmed/49-11-427.pdf , probably of the variety made in the USA;
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/U.S._Embassy_profiles_on_Icelandic_PM,_Foreign_Minister,_Ambassador

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A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: 18 May 2010
Source: TheHorse.com [edited]



Iceland's national horse festival, the Landsmot, will continue as
scheduled despite an outbreak of a yet undiagnosed infectious
respiratory disease, according to a statement from the Landsmot's
executive committee and a veterinary official. The country's
preliminary breeding shows, currently in progress, will also continue
as planned. However, additional breeding shows may be organized later
for horses that are too ill to compete in the regular program. "Horse
owners are encouraged to keep the well-being of their horses in mind
and refrain from attending breeding shows and qualifications with
sick horses," the statement read.

The decision was made in Skagafjorathur during a 7 May 2010 meeting
between the executive committee and Sigriathur Bjornsdottir, DVM,
PhD, Veterinary Officer for Horse Diseases at Icelandic Food and
Veterinary Authority (MAST).

Characterized primarily by a dry cough, the respiratory disease
causes weakness and sometimes nasal drainage, shortness of breath,
or, in more severe cases, fever. Symptoms can continue up to 6 weeks,
according to a fact sheet provided by MAST.

"It is not possible to stop the epidemic," Bjornsdottir said.
"Because it has such mild symptoms, it was already widespread when
reported to official veterinarians." The disease is particularly
common among riding horses because they are stabled with other
horses, she added.

Although the source of the infection has not yet been identified, the
most likely agent is a virus that is sometimes accompanied by a
bacterial infection, according to Bjornsdottir. Most known epidemics
have been ruled out, as well as any connection to the ash and gases
emitted by the 14 Apr 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajokull. "I can
confirm that equine influenza, equine herpesvirus, and rhinoviruses
have been excluded, and it has no relation to the volcanic eruption," she said.

The infection has spread rapidly since the 1st cases were reported in
early April 2010, leading veterinarians to believe this is a new
disease to Iceland, according to the MAST fact sheet. "This suggests
that the entire horse population is sensitive to infection, and
therefore, (there is) probably a new infectious agent involved in
this country," it read.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail

[Sounds like the equine version of Kennel Cough. While one might
expect that few horses from outside Iceland may have gone to this
event because of the ongoing volcanic activity, it would be wise if
any such horses are quarantined on their return. - Mod.MHJ]

[For the interactive HealthMap/ProMED map of Iceland, see
. More information on the etiology of
this outbreak would be greatly appreciated. - Mod.MPP]
......................................mpp/mhj/msp/mpp

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Estimating Air Emissions from Animal Feeding Operations'

An old (2002) report, but worth a read and definately calls for a follow-up;
http://cart.nap.edu/cart/deliver.cgi?record_id=10391&type=pdf_chapter

Pro-Med Solicitations/ Help to Track Infectious Animal "Species-Hopping" Disease

We most certainly cant count on our governments to do the job: SUPPORT PRO-MEDs efforts would you please!

Dear Friends:

The costs of doing a poor job tracking infectious diseases as they move between animals and humans has been staggering over the last 60 years --which is why making a gift now to ProMED-mail’s Spring 2010 Internet-a-thon is so important.

-jumping pathogens have caused more than 65 percent of infectious disease outbreaks in the past six decades, and have racked up more than $200 billion in economic losses worldwide over the past 10 years, according to a report issued last year September by the U.S. Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the National Research Council.

Lack of communication between those tracking human and animal health has led to missed opportunities to detect and quickly contain species-crossing pathogens, the report notes.

To improve coordination and communication between groups, ProMED’s current staff of nearly 40 experts in 16 countries includes 7 veterinarians and veterinary medical health specialists -- one in Thailand, one in Cameroon, one in Israel, one in Tanzania, and three in the U.S. We recently reviewed ProMED postings from 1996 to 2004 and found that more than 10,000 reports on animal disease were posted during that interval. Approximately 30 percent covered diseases that can be transmitted between animals and humans. The remaining related to animal diseases in both domestic animals and wildlife.(* See also: Germ Warfare: "Is Our Gov't Trying to Kill Us? - http://publikeye.blogspot.com/2010/05/is-your-government-trying-to-kill-you.html )

Your gift supports this “One Health” focus that has been part of our operating philosophy since ProMED’s inception. Your gift enables us to reach over 50,000 public health officials, students, journalists, agricultural specialists and infectious disease professionals working with humans, animals, and plants in 187 countries every day, free of charge, regardless of their ability to pay.
Your gift supports our ability to network with on-the-ground disease spotters on six continents, who provide an accurate, unbiased early warning system on disease outbreaks as they occur. Your gift funds our expert commentators, who tell you what these reports mean and how best to respond. Perhaps most importantly, your gift enables us to retain our independence and objectivity, giving us the ability to report disease outbreaks without interference from any special interests or governments.

We realize these continue to be challenging financial times. But ProMED provides a vitally needed service that protects us all -- and that can only be preserved with your help. So please show your support by donating online now or printing out our online form and mailing in your donation.

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Stuff My Daddy Said About Monsanto

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leslie-hatfield/much-ado-about-monsanto-a_b_484023.html

ANTHRAX, HUMAN, CAPRINE - COLOMBIA: (LA GUAJIRA) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

A***************************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: May 17, 2010
Source: Pueblo en linea, Xinua News Agency report [in Spanish, trans.
Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ, edited]



Health authorities of the department of La Guajira in northern
Colombia have banned the consumption of goat meat after news of a
case of anthrax in an indigenous girl who had ingested the meat.

Claudia Meza, secretary of health for La Guajira, noted that goat
meat is an essential part of the diet of the indigenous Wayuu people
who inhabit the Guajira Peninsula [in northern Colombia and
northwestern Venezuela.] "We have information that the meat from
animals which died from disease is being sold; what we want is to
[stop] the transmission, in case what we are seeing is
gastrointestinal anthrax, which is a more serious illness and prone
to more complications," Meza said.

According to the official, the disease has killed several goats and
apparently the girl ate contaminated meat. She is recovering in a
hospital in the city of Riohacha, the departmental capital of La Guajira.

Meza indicated that other possible cases of infection are being investigated.

--
Communicated by:
HealthMap Alerts via ProMED-mail


[Anthrax is seldom reported in Colombia. Previous outbreaks have been
in Caqueta (SE of Bogota), in the Colombian llanos since 1998, and in
Cesar (2006) and Cundinamarca (2007). It would seem from this report
that this disease is below the Colombian veterinary radar. Granted
that paramilitary activities and drug activity are not an
encouragement to be proactive in some areas of the country though
presently reduced.

The wording of the report above indicates that the diagnosis may be
preliminary. Clarification from our Colombian members would be appreciated.

This is the 1st ProMED-mail posting for anthrax in Colombia. - Mod.MHJ]

[An administrative map of Colombia can be seen at

and the HealthMap/ProMED mail interactive map of the country is available at
. - Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]
...................................mpp/mhj/mj/mpp

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EQUINE INFECTIOUS ANEMIA - USA (MONTANA)

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A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: 14 May 2010
Source: The Horse.com [edited]



Because 2 horses recently tested positive for equine infectious
anemia (EIA) in Montana, the Montana Department of Livestock's Animal
Health Division has scheduled a 17 May 2010 meeting in Gallatin
county to update local horse owners on the situation.

EIA, also called swamp fever, was reported in Gallatin county on 26
Apr 2010 after a horse tested positive following a routine Coggins test.

"The horse was going to be traveling out of state, which is how the
positive came up," said Tahnee Szymanski, DVM, a staff veterinarian
for the Department of Livestock. "As a result of the positive test, 2
more horses on the premises were tested, and we found one other positive."

50 nearby horses were also tested. As of 13 May 2010, about 45 of
those tests had come back, all negative, said Szymanski. She expected
the rest of the test results in the next day or so.

Because of the infectious nature of EIA, horses testing positive must
be euthanized or quarantined for life. The 2 positive horses were
quarantined for transport to an EIA-positive herd. Szymanski
explained that these herds are bled monthly for lab efficiency testing.

"In that way, these animals can contribute to our understanding of
the disease, and they do not have to be euthanized," she said.

EIA is spread by biting insects and through contaminated needles,
said Szymanski.

"We recommend annual testing and like to see horses that travel for
equine-related events tested twice a year," she said. "While Coggins
tests are routinely required for horses traveling out of state, some
boarding facilities and events now require negative Coggins tests as
well. Some farms also require a negative test to bring an animal in
for breeding."

The 17 May 2010 meeting will be held at 10 a.m. at the Gallatin
County Fairgrounds, Building 4.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail

[EIA is a viral disease (EIAV) of members of the horse family.
Identified in France in 1843 and first tentatively diagnosed in the
United States in 1888, it has commanded a great deal of attention
over the years.

EIA is the 1st retrovirus-induced disease proven to be transmitted by
insects (Stein et al. 1942). And EIAV is the 1st persistent virus for
which "antigenic drift" was defined (Kono 1972). (Antigenic drift is
the virus's ability to change its form sufficiently so that it is no
longer vulnerable to existing antibodies.) Finally, EIA is the 1st
retrovirus-induced disease for which a diagnostic test was approved
(Coggins and Norcross 1972).

More recently, the EIAV has been recognized as a lentivirus, the type
that causes slowly progressive, often fatal diseases. It is a close
relative to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). In fact, EIAV was the 1st
virus shown to be related to the HIV through cross-reaction in tests
of blood serum (Montagnier et al. 1984). These 2 lentiviruses share
many structural and biochemical features, and EIAV is thought to
serve as a useful model for many aspects of HIV research, especially
for discovery of common mechanisms of immunologic control (Montelaro
and Issel 1990).

An effective test for antibodies specific to EIAV was described in
1970 by Leroy Coggins, D.V.M. for collaborators (Coggins and Patten
1970) and was rapidly adopted by authorities around the world. The
agar-gel immunoddiffusion (AGID) or Coggins test was shown to
correlate with horse inoculation test results for EIAV and,
therefore, could be used to identify EIAV carriers (Coggins et al.
1972). Because only members of the horse family were shown to be
infected, programs based on serologic testing were designed and
adopted to help control the spread of EIAV (Campbell 1971).

When horses are exposed to EIAV, they may develop severe, acute signs
of disease and die within 2 to 3 weeks. This acute response is rarely
seen in natural situations, where blood-feeding insects transmit low
doses of virus.

Nonetheless, this form of the disease is the most damaging and the
most difficult to diagnose because the signs appear rapidly, and
often only an elevated body temperature is noted. At this early stage
of the infection, the horse usually tests negative for antibodies to
EIAV, and blood samples must be collected at a subsequent date
(generally 10 to 14 days later) to confirm or exclude EIA as a
diagnosis. During this period, it is prudent to quarantine the horse
(or the farm) if EIA is strongly suspected on the basis of history or signs.

The clinical signs of the acute form of EIA are rather nonspecific,
and in mild cases, the initial fever may be short lived (often less
than 24 hours). As a result, horse owners and veterinarians may not
observe this initial response when a horse is infected with EIAV.
These infected horses often recover and continue to move freely in
the population. The 1st indication that a horse was exposed to and
infected with EIAV may well be a positive result on a routine annual test.

Fever - An infected horse's temperature may rise suddenly to about
105 F or, rarely, as high as 108 F. Then, it may drop back to normal
for an indeterminate period until the onset of another episode.

Petechial hemorrhages - Minute, blood colored spots appear on the
mucous membranes.

Depression - The horse appears more or less dejected (head hangs low)
and generally listless.

Weight loss - The horse may refuse feed or may eat an inordinate
amount but still continue an obvious decline from normal weight.

Dependent edema - The horse may develop swelling, evidence of fluid
collecting under the skin in the legs, under the chest and other
underbody surfaces.

Anemia - The horse's blood may have a marked drop in its red
corpuscle count and appear thin and watery. The animal may also have
an irregular heartbeat, and a jugular pulse may become evident.

The horse with chronic EIA is the classic "swamper," who has lost
condition, is lethargic and anorexic, has a low hematocrit, and
demonstrates a persistent decrease in the number of blood platelets
(thrombocytopenia), especially coincident with fever induced by EIAV
(Clabough et al. 1991).

EIA is considered a classic blood-borne infection. People have played
an important role in EIAV transmission over the years by using
blood-contaminated materials on different horses. Although this mode
of transmission was more prevalent before serologic tests to identify
EIAV carriers were available, it is wise for owners and veterinarians
to apply the same universal precautions that are used to reduce the
risk of spreading blood-borne disease agents in humans (U.S.
Department of Labor 1992).

The EIAV most frequently is transmitted between horses in close
proximity by large biting insects, such as horse flies and deer flies
(tabanids), which inflict painful bites (Issel and Foil 1984). The
bites from these tabanids stimulate defensive movement by the horse,
which often results in an interruption of the blood-feeding. When
interrupted, the fly is motivated to complete the feeding as soon as
possible. It then attacks the same or a 2nd host and feeds to
repletion. In this manner, any infective material from the blood of
the 1st host which is present on the mouthparts of the insect can be
mechanically transmitted to the 2nd host.

Controlling the spread of EIAV involves minimizing or eliminating
contact of horses with the secretions, excretions, and blood of
EIAV-infected horses. This has been accomplished in most areas of the
world by testing and segregating test-positive horses from those that
are test-negative. When this separation is done, it is imperative to
retest the test-negative band at 30- to 60-day intervals until new
cases fail to appear. Once the reservoirs of EIAV are identified,
separated, and maintained a safe distance from other horses, the
transmission of EIAV is broken. This sounds easy, but until all
horses are tested, one must assume that each horse is a potential
reservoir of EIAV and take precautions to commingle only horses whose
background is impeccable, i.e., they come from farms where only
test-negative horses are found and have never been exposed to
test-positive horses or other equids.

This comment has been extracted from:
.
- Mod.TG]

[see also:
Equine infectious anemia: resources available 20100415.1226
2007
---
Equine infectious anemia - USA (NM ex TX) 20070831.2872
2006
---
Equine infectious anemia - USA (VA) 20060803.2154
2002
---
Equine infectious anemia - USA (Georgia) 20020825.5148
Equine infectious anemia, law change - USA (Texas) 20020501.4062
2000
---
Equine infectious anemia - USA (Montana) (02) 20000624.1040
Equine infectious anemia - USA (Montana) 20000619.0998
1999
---
Equine infectious anemia - USA (New York) 19991129.21032
Equine infectious anemia - USA (Utah) 19991127.2092
Equine infectious anemia - USA (Penn.) 19991104.1978
Equine infectious anemia - USA (Virginia) 19990921.1684]
...............................................tg/msp/dk

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using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
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MARE REPRODUCTIVE LOSS SYNDROME, EQUINE - USA: (KENTUCKY)

***********************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: 14 May 2010
Source: Horsetalk [edited]



Four dead late or full-term foetuses taken for examination at the
University of Kentucky's Livestock Disease Diagnostic Centre showed
signs consistent with mare reproductive loss syndrome (MRLS). The
syndrome is linked to the accidental ingestion of eastern tent caterpillars.

The university warned in mid-April 2010
() that
caterpillar numbers were up for the 3rd consecutive year and advised
horse owners to reduce the chances of pregnant mares ingesting the
caterpillars.

The disease centre said the fetuses and foals had lesions and
bacterial isolates consistent with the syndrome. "All were either
term-foals or late-gestation fetuses," it said. "The cases occurred
as single losses on different central Kentucky farms. The 1st case
was submitted on 1 May 2010, and these cases correspond temporally
with MRLS cases occurring in prior years."

During the 2009 foaling season, about 12 cases of MRLS foal losses
were diagnosed.

Kentucky horse owners have been advised to check wild cherry and
related trees for eastern tent caterpillar activity to determine
whether management is necessary.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail

[Mare reproductive loss syndrome is a real syndrome which remains
somewhat elusive but which has come to be recognized as strongly
associated with the eastern tent caterpillar.

This syndrome includes early fetal loss, late fetal loss, uveitis,
pericarditis, and encephalitis, [from] tissue penetration by septic
barbed setal fragments (septic penetrating setae) from eastern tent
caterpillars (_Malacosoma americanum_). Once ingested, these barbed
setal fragments migrate through moving tissues, followed by rapid
hematogenous spread of bacteria, bacterial emboli, and/or septic
fragments of setae (septic penetrating setal emboli), collectively
referred to as septic materials.

Pathogenic bacteria, therefore, enter the horse as hitchhikers on or
in the caterpillar setal fragments, and MRLS is caused by 1) the
barbed setal fragments' ability to penetrate moving tissues,
including blood vessels, releasing septic materials which rapidly
distribute hematogenously; 2) the high sensitivity of the pregnant
mare to bacteria from such septic materials introduced into the
uterus, fetal membranes, or fetal fluids; 3) the unusually broad
spectrum of bacterial pathogens carried on or in the setal fragments;
and 4) the less effective antibacterial responses in certain
susceptible extracellular fluids (e.g., fetal, ocular, pericardial,
and cerebrospinal fluids).

These caterpillars are very small and easily consumed in the grass as
they drop off the trees surrounding the pastures. Some years are
worse for these caterpillars than other years. However, it takes 10
or less of these extremely tiny caterpillars to affect a 680 kg (1500
lbs) pregnant mare.

The eastern tent caterpillar occurs throughout the eastern United
States west to the Rocky Mountains and north into southern Canada. It
is native to the region, and references to it as a tree pest date
back to early colonial times from the mid-1600's. However, references
to it as a problem for horses seem to have begun about 2000-2001. A
photo of the caterpillars may be seen at:
.

The eastern tent caterpillar is largely resistant to many
insecticides. This creature is a pest to many, especially the equine industry.

Portions of this comment have been extracted from
and
.
- Mod.TG]
................................................tg/msp/dk

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and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
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