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Showing posts with label Food Safety. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Food Safety. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 28, 2009

Swine Flu: Another Case of Human to Pig Transmission

INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (H1N1) 2009, ANIMAL (19): ICELAND SWINE, OIE
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International Society for Infectious Diseases


[1]
Date: Tue 27 Oct 2009
Source: OIE's Weekly Disease Information Vol. 22 - No. 44 [edited]



Information received on 27 Oct 2009 from Mr Halldor Runolfsson, Chief
Veterinary Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Authority
of Iceland, Selfoss, Iceland

Summary
Report type: Immediate notification
Start date: 24 Oct 2009
Date of 1st confirmation of the event: 27 Oct 2009
Report date: 27 Oct 2009
Date submitted to OIE: 27 Oct 2009
Reason for notification: Emerging disease
Morbidity: 10 percent
Mortality: 0 percent
Zoonotic impact: Possible transmission of the influenza virus between
humans and pigs
Causal agent: Pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus
Serotype: Other
This event pertains to the whole country

New outbreaks
Summary of outbreaks
Total outbreaks: 1
Location(s) : GULLBRINGU (Minni-Vatnsleysa, Vogar)
Total animals affected
Species / Susceptible / Cases / Deaths / Destroyed / Slaughtered
Swine / 4500 / 10 / 0 / 0 / 0

Epidemiology
Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection: Possible
transmission from human to pigs
Epidemiological comments: Clinical signs commenced on 24 Oct 2009
with 10 sows off feed, temperature greater than 40 C, some were
coughing, and 2 aborted. Two workers had had flu-like symptoms for a
few days prior to the clinical signs in the pigs.

Control measures
Measures applied: Quarantine, Movement control inside the country,
Vaccination prohibited [see comment] , No treatment of affected
animals
Measures to be applied: No other measures

Diagnostic test results
Laboratory name and type: Institute for Experimental Pathology at
Keldur, Iceland (National laboratory)
Tests and results
Species / Test / Test date / Result
Swine / reverse transcription - polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) /
27 Oct 2009 / Positive

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail

[Iceland is the 10th country reporting infection of pigs, in
commercial farms, with the influenza pandemic A/H1N1 virus. The
previous countries were Canada, Argentina, Australia, Singapore, UK
(Northern Ireland), Ireland, Norway, USA and Japan. In all incidents,
humans were suspected to be the source of infection. The clinical
signs, in all cases, were rather mild. Though swine influenza is not
included in OIE's list of reportable diseases, these outbreaks were
reported as "emerging disease."

Infections have also been seen in turkeys, reported from Chile and
Canada; see posting 20091027.3719 and item 2 further. As in the
outbreaks in pigs, humans were suspected to be the source of
infection. The clinical signs in turkeys were reminiscent of those
seen in cases of low-pathogenic avian influenza, main losses caused
by a significant drop of egg production.

The term "vaccination prohibited" included among the control measures
may be confusing at times. This phrase is used in the OIE
questionnaire when vaccination is not applied, apparently
disregarding the reason. - Mod.AS]

******
[2]
Date: Tue 28 Oct 2009
From: Dave Halvorson


The prohibition of vaccine use [see comment to item 1 above] begs
further commentary.

What is a farmer to do to protect his breeder turkeys effectively
from a human virus? If government regulators have the answer to that
question, they should provide it. If public health personnel cannot
prevent the spread of novel H1N1 from person to person, then it is
unlikely that veterinarians can devise strategies to prevent human to
animal transmission. Biosecurity cannot protect turkeys from people
who are incubating or sick due to novel H1N1.

The economics of producing turkey hatching eggs involves hens valued
at USD 40-50 at the parent flock level. Influenza largely stops all
egg production, which means this hen now becomes worth next to
nothing. So 5000 turkeys lose up to USD 250 000 in value almost
overnight.

--
David A. Halvorson, DVM
Diplomate, ACPV
Professor Emeritus
College Of Veterinary Medicine
University of Minnesota
Saint Paul, Minnesota 55108


[The situation described by Dr Halvorson resembles the scenario of
non highly pathogenic avian influenza in turkeys; it remains to be
seen whether an inactivated novel/pandemic H1N1 animal vaccine, when
becoming commercially available, would be allowed. As indicated in
OIE's Manual, since the 1970s in the USA, there has been some use of
inactivated vaccines produced under special license on a commercial
basis. These vaccines have been used primarily in turkeys against
viruses that are not highly pathogenic but that may cause severe
clinical signs, especially in exacerbating circumstances. Significant
quantities of this vaccine have been used. In recent years in the
USA, most of the special license inactivated vaccine has been used in
breeder turkeys to protect against H1 and H3 swine influenza viruses.
Conventional vaccination against the prevailing strain of LPAI has
also been used in Italy for a number of years. Vaccination against
H9N2 infections has been used in Pakistan, Iran, China, as well as
several countries in the Middle East. - Mod.AS]

[see also:
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (18): Canada (ON) avian, OIE
20091027.3719
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (17): Japan (OS) swine, OIE
20091022.3635
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (16): Canada (ON) avian 20091022.3629
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (15): USA (OR) ferret
20091021.3618
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (14): Canada (ON),
avian 20091020.3602
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (13): USA swine, conf. 20091020.3600
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (12): USA swine, susp 20091019.3592
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (11): Norway 20091019.3589
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (10): Ireland 20091002.3427
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal (09): UK (NI) swine, OIE 20090918.3280
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (08): Singapore, swine
20090904.3114
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (07): Chile, avian 20090829.3036
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (06): Canada, swine 20090828.3027
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (05): Austr., swine 20090826.2999
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (04): Chile, avian, OIE
20090823.2978
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (03): Chile, avian, RFI
20090821.2961
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health (02): Austr., swine 20090820.2951
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, animal health: Canada (QC) 20090729.2661
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (17), Argentina, OIE 20090703.2401
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (16), Argentina, swine, OIE 20090626.2322
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (15), Egypt, pig cull 20090617.2241
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (14), EU preparedness, Egypt 20090615.2220
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (13) swine, Canada, origin, RFI 20090615.2215
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (12) swine trial inf. 20090605.2088
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (11) swine trial inf. 20090604.2067
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (10) swine, Canada, cull 20090514.1813
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (09), swine, Canada 20090513.1790
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (08), food safety, FAO/OIE/WHO 20090507.1710
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (07), swine, Canada, OIE 20090506.1691
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (06), Canada, OIE 20090505.1683
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (05), swine, Canada, FAO 20090505.1680
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (04), infected swine, Canada 20090502.1653
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health (03), Egypt, pig cull 20090502.1649
Influenza A (H1N1): animal health 20090430.1637
Influenza A (H1N1), "swine flu": animal health (02), Egypt,
prevention 20090429.1623
Influenza A (H1N1), "swine flu": animal health 20090428.1604]
...............................................arn/msp/lm

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Thursday, October 22, 2009

Cargill recalls beef tongues - Banned Organs Found

Last week, China banned imported meat from Tyson for the same exact reason,...banned organs not removed from carcasses. Good Going USDA. Sleepin on the job agin, ay ye?

MILWAUKEE - A Cargill Meat Solutions plant in Milwaukee is voluntarily recalling over 5,500 pounds of beef tongues because the tonsils may not have been completely removed.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service says tonsils need to be removed because the tissue could contain the infective agent in cattle with mad cow disease.

Removing the tonsils minimizes potential human exposure; there's no indication these cattle were infected.

Cargill spokesman Mark Klein says the company acted quickly when the problem was discovered.

The recall includes various weight cases of "Beef Tongue Number 1 White." Each case has the establishment number EST.17690. The affected packages were produced between Oct. 12 and Oct. 14 and were shipped to distribution centers in Illinois.

Cargill Meat Solutions is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cargill Inc., based in Wayzata, Minn.

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-ap-wi-beeftonguerecall,0,3278187.s

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

MickyD's Introduces McMad-Cow Burger

Just for fun, but a big hit with people who "just dont care" what they eat or already have CJD (the human version of mad-cow disease) and dont mind eating a few (more) (live) malformed prions with their fries. Those things dont cook out you know. Scientist have even discovered the pesky little buggers living in feedlot soil!

Tuesday, October 6, 2009

U.S. Beef & Pork Markets Deteriorate / Nat'l Institute of Health Report Links Processed Meat to Colon Cancer

The Meat Industry Research Conference (once again the star performer section of AMI convention) had a blockbuster paper presented by a speaker from National Institute of Health - foreshadowing the imminent release of research findings showing very strong links between consumption of red meats (and especially of processed meat products) with incidence of colon cancer in huma

Click on title above for full report;
http://www.meatinternational.com/world-outlook/north-america/us-beef-and-pork-markets-deteriorate-id1308.html

Wednesday, November 19, 2008

Boycott Chinese Food Products

Pass the following along to everyone concerned about food from China. Trader Joes stopped importing all single ingredient items from China about a year and a half ago. The are also good about labeling and have products from the USA and many parts of the world.The following is an entry from the China Boycott database for Trader Joe's:

Food Market, Trader Joe's Trader Joe's
http://www.traderjoes.com/
http://www.traderjoes.com/Attachments/all_locations.pdf,
http://www.traderjoes.com/contact_us_selection.html,
Country of Origin: USA

"In October 2007, Trader Joe's began to phase out foods imported from China amid concerns that standards on "organic" products from the country aren't as stringent as they should be." Wikipedia

At my local TJs I found that all their produce items are no longer imported from China. However multi-ingredient prepared foods may have ingredients from china, so ask about products that do not list the country of origin or say "distributed by Trader Joes Monrovia, California".

XXXX

--- On Mon, 11/17/08, XXXXX
Subject: Chicken from Wal-Mart
Date: Monday, November 17, 2008, 11:35 PM

This e-mail is going around warning people not to buy 'chicken' at Wal-Mart

XXXXXX

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

Petition to USDA: No US Import of Canadian Beef

USDA Petition Against Risky Canadian Meat
Click on title above to see Petition

On January 28, 2008, Food & Water Watch submitted a petition to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service urging the agency to remove Canada from the list of countries eligible to export meat and poultry products to the United States.


CITIZEN PETITION BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE


Mr. Alfred Almanza, Administrator
Food Safety and Inspection Service
United States Department of Agriculture
331-E Jamie L. Whitten Building
12th Street and Jefferson Drive SW
Washington, DC 20250




HAND DELIVERED



PETITION TO REMOVE CANADA AS A COUNTRY ELIGIBLE TO EXPORT MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS UNDER 9 C.F.R. §§ 327.2 (b) and 381.196 (b)

Dear Administrator Almanza,

On behalf of the non–profit consumer organization, Food & Water Watch, I respectfully submit this petition, pursuant the Federal Meat Inspection Act as amended,1 the Poultry Products Inspection Act as amended,2 the Right to Petition Government Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,3 the Administrative Procedure Act,4 and USDA’s implementing regulations,5 for a rule issued by the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) to remove Canada as a country that is eligible to export meat and poultry products to the United States under 9 C.F.R. §§ 327.2 (b) and 381.196 (b) (2006). Food & Water Watch is requesting this action because of the extensive evidence that the Canadian inspection system does not assure compliance with requirements equivalent to all the inspection, building construction standards, and other requirements of the FMIA and PPIA and regulations applicable to official establishments in the United States, and that reliance cannot be placed upon Canada’s certificates of eligibility. As a consequence, Canadian meat and poultry processors are exporting products to the United States that may be harmful to U.S. consumers and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is not able to take effective action to prevent those products from entering U.S. commerce.



I. Statement of the LawUnder the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) 6 and Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) 7 and regulations promulgated under these laws, only products prepared in establishments that are certified by a foreign country as meeting equivalent standards and requirements as official establishments in the United States are eligible for importation into the United States. When the Administrator of FSIS determines that a foreign nation’s system of meat inspection for establishments exporting to the United States ensures such requirements and standards are met, the country is listed under 9 C.F.R. § 327.2 (b) and the products prepared in such establishments are eligible for importation. The acceptability of a foreign meat inspection system is based on FSIS’ determination, under § 327.2 (a)(2)(i), that the country’s inspection system provide standards equivalent to those of the Federal system of meat inspection in the United States with respect to:

Organizational structure and staffing, so as to insure uniform enforcement of the requisite laws and regulations in all establishments throughout the system at which products are prepared for export to the United States;
Ultimate control and supervision by the national government over the official activities of all employees or licensees of the system;
The assignment of competent, qualified inspectors;
Authority and responsibility of national inspection officials to enforce the requisite laws and regulations governing meat inspection and to certify or refuse to certify products intended for export;
Adequate administrative and technical support;
The inspection, sanitation, quality, species verification, and residue standards applied to products produced in the United States;
Other requirements of adequate inspection service as required by the regulations in this subchapter.

Further, under § 327.2 (a)(2)(ii), the foreign government must maintain a food inspection system equivalent to the system of meat inspection organized and maintained in the United States with respect to:

Ante–mortem inspection of animals for slaughter and inspection of methods of slaughtering and handling in connection with slaughtering which shall be performed by veterinarians or by other employees or licensees of the system under the direct supervision of the veterinarians;
Post–mortem inspection of carcasses and parts thereof at time of slaughter, performed by veterinarians or other employees or licensees of the system under the direct supervision of veterinarians;
Official controls by the national government over establishment construction, facilities, and equipment;
Direct and continuous official supervision of slaughtering and preparation of product, by the assignment of inspectors to establishments certified [under this section], to assure that adulterated or misbranded product is not prepared for export to the United States;
Complete separation of establishments certified [under this section] from establishments not certified and the maintenance of a single standard of inspection and sanitation throughout all certified establishments;
Requirements for sanitation at certified establishments and for sanitary handling of product;
Official controls over condemned material until destroyed or removed and thereafter excluded from the establishment;
A Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system, as set forth in part 417 of this chapter;
Other matters for which requirements are contained in the Act or regulations in this subchapter.


Specific regulations under the Poultry Products Inspection Act, 9 C.F.R. § 381.196 (a)(2)(i)-(ii), provide nearly verbatim criteria for evaluating a foreign country’s inspection system for poultry products. Countries meeting these requirements for poultry are listed under 9 C.F.R. § 381.196 (b).

The Administrator of FSIS may withdraw a §§ 327.2 (b) and/or 381.196 (b) listing of any foreign country when the Administrator determines that the foreign country’s system of meat or poultry product inspection “does not assure compliance with requirements equivalent to all the inspection, building construction standards, and other requirements” of the FMIA and PPIA and regulations applicable to official establishments in the United States, that reliance cannot be placed upon certificates from authorities of such foreign country, or that, for lack of current information, such foreign country should be required to reestablish its eligibility for listing.8




II. Background on Canada’s Exports of Meat and Poultry ProductsCanada is the largest exporter of meat and poultry products to the United States. During FY 2006, it exported 1,783,882,689 pounds of meat and poultry products to the United States9 that accounted for 45.9 percent of all imported meat and poultry products into the United States.10 There are currently 462 meat and poultry plants in Canada that are certified to export their products to the United States.11

Canada has been deemed to have a food safety system that is equivalent to that of the United States. It has been listed under 9 C.F.R. §§ 327.2 (b) and 381.196 (b) and its food establishments are eligible to export meat and poultry products to the United States.

As it does with all countries that are eligible to export meat and poultry products, FSIS has conducted annual audits of a selected number of Canadian food establishments that are eligible to export to the United States.13

As discussed more fully below, FSIS auditors have found repeated violations of U.S. standards and requirements in their annual visits. It has also required multiple visits to Canada in some years to verify that U.S. standards were being met at U.S. taxpayers’ expense.15 While some Canadian food establishments have been delisted, FSIS has failed to delist the country as eligible for export to the United States, thus providing the need for this petition.



III. Statement of the Grounds for Withdrawing Canada as a Country Listed 9 C.F.R. §§ 327.2 (b) and 381.196 (b) as Eligible to Export to the United States.As discussed in detail below, a December 2005 USDA Inspector General’s audit of Canada’s meat and poultry inspection system found that Canadian inspection officials do not enforce requirements or maintain inspection intensity at levels equivalent to those FSIS applies, or is required to apply, to official establishments in the United States. In addition, FSIS audits of Canadian establishments in 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007 show numerous and repeated failures both in terms of establishments’ adherence to sanitation and food safety requirements, as well as the inspection system’s enforcement of those requirements. Further, FSIS has instituted two large recalls in 2007 of meat and poultry products produced in Canada.

Based on all of this information, the Administrator can only conclude that Canada’s system of meat and poultry inspection does not assure compliance with the requirements equivalent to all the inspection, building construction standards, and other requirements of the Federal Meat Inspection Act and Poultry Products Inspection Act and corresponding regulations applicable to official establishments in the United States. Furthermore, reliance cannot be placed upon Canada’s certificate of eligibility. Therefore, the Administrator must withdraw Canada from the list of countries eligible to export to the United States under 9 C.F.R. §§ 327.2 (b) and 381.196 (b). The failure to delist Canada would be contrary to the FMIA and PPIA. The failure to delist Canada would also be arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion, and thus contrary to the Administrative Procedures Act.16



A. A December 2005 USDA Inspector General’s Audit Report on Canada’s meat and poultry inspection system found that Canadian inspection officials do not enforce requirements or maintain inspection intensity at levels equivalent to those FSIS applies, or is required to apply, to official establishments in the United States.


The chronic food safety issues that FSIS auditors have found in Canadian food establishments prompted the USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG) to conduct its own audit of the Canadian food safety system and the processes FSIS used to determine equivalence with Canada. The OIG found the following:

. . . [I]n July 2003, FSIS identified that Canadian inspection officials were not enforcing certain pathogen reduction and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system regulations. These same types of concerns were identified again in June 2005, almost 2 years later.

Timely actions were not taken because FSIS does not have protocols or guidelines for evaluating deficiencies in a country’s inspection system that could jeopardize a country’s overall equivalence determination…

In July 2003, as part of an onsite review, FSIS identified serious concerns with the Canadian inspection system. These concerns included the insufficient implementation of sanitation controls and HACCP requirements by establishments and the lack of enforcement in these areas by Canadian inspection officials.

Based on these concerns, FSIS proposed an enforcement review in 2004. (Enforcement reviews can lead to a determination that a country’s system is not equivalent to U.S. standards and, thus, not eligible to export to the United States). The proposed 2004 enforcement review was not conducted and FSIS officials did not reassess Canada’s implementation and enforcement of sanitation controls and HAACP requirements until almost 2 years later. When FSIS officials finally returned to Canada in May 2005, they continued to find the same types of deficiencies they had found in 2003.

FSIS should analyze the deficiencies identified in the 2003 and 2005 reviews to determine whether immediate actions are needed to address concerns regarding public health and if additional enforcement measures are needed.

FSIS’ analysis of the regulations governing the Canadian inspection system identified two areas that may not be equivalent to the United States inspection system. FSIS found that Canadian policy allowed less than daily inspection coverage in processing establishments. By contrast, FSIS has a long established history of requiring the presence of an inspector in a U.S. processing establishment at least once per shift per day. FSIS also identified differences in the testing performed for Listeria monocytogenes. Canadian inspection officials require establishments to perform risk-based environmental sampling, as opposed to the finished product sampling required by FSIS.17



B. FSIS audits of Canadian establishments in 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007 show numerous and repeated failures both in terms of establishments’ adherence to sanitation and food safety requirements, as well as the inspection system’s enforcement of those requirements.


According to FSIS audits in 2003,18 Canadian establishments repeatedly failed to adhere to sanitation and food safety requirements and the Canadian inspection officials failed to enforce these requirements:

In 22 of the 37 establishments visited, FSIS officials found that the Canadian inspection system did not have adequate sanitation controls. FSIS officials found that Canadian establishments did not ensure sanitation controls were adequately implemented or evaluated for effectiveness. FSIS also found that the establishments did not take corrective actions when sanitation controls failed to prevent direct product contamination or adulteration and did not maintain daily records of these activities.
FSIS officials found that Canadian inspection officials did not implement certain HACCP requirements in 27 of the 37 establishments. FSIS found that Canadian establishments were deficient in validating their HACCP plans, documenting corrective actions, and reassessing the adequacy of the plans.
As part of the review of specific establishments, FSIS evaluated whether Canadian inspection officials adequately enforced FSIS requirements. FSIS officials found that the Canadian inspection system did not have adequate controls to ensure FSIS requirements were enforced. FSIS officials identified deficiencies in the areas of sanitation controls and HACCP requirements that had not been previously noted by Canadian inspection officials. This condition occurred in 32 of the 37 establishments visited by FSIS officials.
Of the 37 establishments visited, 28 were establishments that produced processed products. FSIS officials found that Canadian inspection officials provided less than daily inspection at 10 of the 28 processing establishments visited.



Audits in 2005 demonstrated a similar pattern of abuses:19

In 21 of the 35 establishments, FSIS officials found that the Canadian inspection system did not have adequate sanitation controls. FSIS continued to find that Canadian establishments did not ensure sanitation controls were adequately implemented or evaluated for effectiveness. In addition, the establishments did not take corrective actions when sanitation controls failed to prevent direct product contamination or adulteration and did not maintain daily records of these activities.
FSIS officials found that Canadian inspection officials did not implement certain HACCP requirements in 19 of the 35 establishments. FSIS again found that Canadian establishments were deficient in validating their HACCP plans, documenting corrective actions, and reassessing the adequacy of the plans.
As part of the review of specific establishments, FSIS again evaluated whether Canadian inspection officials adequately enforced FSIS requirements. FSIS officials found that the Canadian inspection system did not have adequate controls to ensure FSIS requirements were enforced. FSIS officials identified deficiencies in the areas of sanitation controls and HACCP requirements that had not been previously noted by Canadian inspection officials. This condition occurred in 29 of the 35 establishments visited by FSIS officials.

Later that year, the USDA OIG notified FSIS that it wanted a complete review of Canadian processing plants that exported to the United States on the issue of daily inspection. The OIG found the following:

On July 29, 2005, we issued a management alert to FSIS which identified a condition that warranted the agency’s immediate attention. We reported that FSIS had not taken timely action to resolve the agency’s July 2003 finding that Canada does not require daily inspection coverage at processing establishments that export product to the United States. Specifically, the agency identified 10 processing establishments that received less than daily inspection and subsequently Canada reported 252 of its processing establishments did not receive daily inspection coverage during all processing shifts. Almost 700 million pounds of product entered U.S. commerce from these 252 establishments from January 1, 2003 through May 31, 2005. In FSIS’ information system, the products were categorized as cuts and trimmings of raw product as well as products with additional processing from pork, veal, beef, poultry, and lamb.20


In August 2005, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) did change its Animal Hygiene Regulations as they applied to exports to the United States that explicitly required daily inspection of processing establishments.21 However, FSIS agreed to permit Canada to conduct a study to prove that less-than-daily inspection in processing was equivalent to the U.S. inspection system. That study was to have been completed by November 2007. According to FSIS officials, CFIA is still evaluating the data it received from the study.22

In October 2005, FSIS dispatched an audit team to Canada to conduct a paper review of the new daily inspection procedures –– FSIS did not conduct in-plant audits to verify whether the new inspection procedures had actually been implemented.

In 2006 audits by FSIS,23 the agency found that establishments were not implementing their Standard Sanitation Operating Procedures (SSOPs), Sanitation Performance Standards (SPS), or HACCP plans, and were not adequately testing for Salmonella:

In 10 of 21 establishments audited, there were deficiencies in the implementation of the Standard Sanitation Operating Procedures. For example, there was improper documentation of daily records for SSOP requirements; improper implementation of SSOPs in 5 establishments; no corrective action taken when SSOP failed to prevent direct product contamination in one establishment; and no reference to pre-operational sanitation in the SSOP prerequisite program, although pre-operational sanitation was occurring at one establishment.
Nineteen of the 21 establishments had deficiencies in the implementation of Sanitation Performance Standards (SPS). The violations found included unsanitary conditions such as insects found in two empty containers used for rework of product and product residue found in bins ready for use.
Fifteen of the 21 establishments had deficiencies in the implementation, corrective actions, verification and/or recordkeeping parts of HAACP. The violations found included inadequate recordkeeping documenting the written HACCP plan, the monitoring of the critical control points, and dates and times of specific occurrences in 11 establishments; in seven establishments, verification and validation of the HACCP plants were not performed properly; in four establishments, the corrective action was not written in the HACCP plan; in three establishments, the HACCP plan was not adequately reassessed; in two establishments, on-going monitoring of the HACCP plan was not performed properly.
Laboratories were using only 25 grams of ready–to–eat products in tests for Salmonella instead of 325 grams. FSIS auditors critiqued the lack of oversight exercised by CFIA over the private laboratories they retained to conduct microbial testing.

No establishments were recommended for delistment.

In August 2007, the USDA OIG issued an audit report on egg processing inspection. Its findings included:

(W)e found that while FSIS had identified deficiencies in 2003 with Canada’s controls over egg product processing plants that exported to the United States, no follow up visits had been made since then to verify that corrective actions had been implemented. FSIS officials gave greater priority to the review of meat and poultry establishments, since processed egg products were considered to pose less of a health risk than some meat products due to the use of the pasteurization process. In their last visit, FSIS reviewers found that two Canadian egg product processing plants broke and used eggs that were leaking or had foreign material on their shells.24


As a result of the OIG report, FSIS conducted audits of four Canadian egg products processing facilities in addition to twenty meat and poultry establishments.

On this visit, one Canadian establishment was recommended for delistment and six received Notices of Intent to Delist.

These were the deficiencies that were found in the 2007 audit:

There was no Canadian method for Salmonella analysis of meat and poultry products that had been deemed equivalent by the United States. Specifically, the problem of the sample size cited in the 2006 audit had not been corrected; only 25 grams of product was being sent in for laboratory analysis while the U.S. standard is 325 grams. As the FSIS audit stated: “Many of the establishments did not understand that they must make that specific request to satisfy U.S. requirements.”
Seventeen of 20 slaughter and/or processing establishments had deficiencies in the implementation, maintenance, corrective actions, and/or recordkeeping requirements of the Standard Sanitation Operating Procedures (SSOPs). The problems discovered included descriptions of non-compliances, causes, corrective actions, and preventive measures were either missing or not written in sufficient detail for the establishments’ management or for CFIA personnel to verify the effectiveness of the actions; records were not completed in the manner described in the HACCP plans, including times and temperatures; the sanitation prerequisite programs did not address the cleaning and monitoring of some areas of the establishments; condensate was present in various rooms and was observed dripping on personnel, boxes, product and/or product contact surfaces; positioning of product presented a variety of cross-contamination scenarios; product handling practices also led to cross-contamination; heavy dust and protein residues were found on fans that led directly into an RTE slicing room; residue from previous day’s production was found on food contact areas; pre-operational sanitation monitoring by one establishment was done on slaughter days only and not on days when there was only processing performed; sanitation records revealed repetitive deficiencies with either no preventive measures or preventive measures were ineffective; and hooks for edible product were not maintained in a sanitary manner.
Nineteen of the 20 slaughter and/or processing establishments had deficiencies in Sanitation Performance Standards (SPS). Two of the four egg products processing facilities had SPS deficiencies. The problems found with SPS included: inedible containers were observed coming into contact with personnel working with edible product, edible product, edible product containers, and/or food contact areas; condensate was present in processing rooms, coolers, freezers; there was rust and corrosion on many pieces of equipment and overhead structures; there was no floor drain in the area of the sticker in a hog plant, which resulted in the operator standing on support pads in a pool of water and blood; establishment of pre-requisite programs for water and/or ice were not written or followed in the manner specified in the CFIA Manual of Procedures; walls, floors, ceilings, and/or overhead structures were in poor repair; exposed insulation in processing room and cooler locations; freezers and storage areas were not maintained in sanitary manner; excessive shell fragments were observed in breaking machines and collection pots; and excessive shell fragments were also observed past the filtering system in the performance of the pour test.
Thirteen of the 20 slaughter/processing/cold storage establishments audited had deficiencies in the implementation of HACCP requirements. Most involved deficiencies in recordkeeping. One of the egg processing facilities had a HACCP deficiency –– calibration of equipment. Examples of the HACCP deficiencies included descriptions of deviations, corrective actions, and preventive measures were either missing or not written in sufficient detail for the establishments’ management or for CFIA personnel to verify the effectiveness of the actions; CCP monitoring and verification records had missing times, missing initials, missing temperatures, and entries that were not actual measured values; HACCP plans had poorly described hazards which led to critical limits, monitoring procedures, corrective actions, preventive measures, and verification procedures that did not follow in a logical manner or address the hazard; pre-shipment reviews were not conducted for all products.
Three of the nine slaughter facilities had deficiencies in their generic E.coli testing program. The problems found included no action taken when total coliform and E. coli counts exceeded the acceptable limits and the recording program for E. coli results was not functioning properly.
One of the nine slaughter facilities never received its residue sampling schedule from CFIA for FY 2006–2007 and no meat was sampled for chemical residues during that time period.
Two establishments that produced both single and multiple species ground products did not have species identification sampling scheduled for them by CFIA.
The FSIS auditor made the following observation: “Inspection system controls at all levels were not fully developed and implemented. There were many instances of deficiencies both in the documentation reviews and in the operations audits that should have been addressed prior to the FSIS audit. Some inspection personnel were not well-trained in the performance of their inspection tasks. Inspection personnel were not conducting pre–operational sanitation inspection verification or were not conducting it at the frequency required.” 26


While all establishments audited were receiving at least daily visits by CFIA inspection personnel, one establishment –– Eastern Protein Foods Limited (Canadian Establishment Number 203) –– did not appear to be inspected from March 2 through May 3, 2007 for the second shift of production. In addition, for a three month period, CFIA inspection personnel did not appear to be conducting on-site pre-operational sanitation verification which is required to be performed at least twice monthly. Instead, CFIA inspection personnel were only conducting record reviews at this establishment.27

FSIS recently sent another audit team to look at the one plant that had been delisted as a result of this audit and the six that had received Notices of the Intent to Delist. According to FSIS officials, all of these plants corrected their deficiencies and continue to export to the United States.28



C. FSIS instituted two large recalls in 2007 of meat and poultry products produced in Canada.

a. Topps Meat Company, LLC Recall of Ground Beef Products

On September 25, 2007, FSIS announced a voluntary recall for 331,582 pounds of frozen ground beef products by the Topps Meat Company, LLC of Elizabeth, New Jersey.29 The recall was eventually expanded to 21.7 million pounds of frozen ground beef products on September 29, 2007.30 The meat was contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7. This recall made it the fifth largest in U.S. history.31 Because of the magnitude of the recall, Topps Meat Company was forced to shutter its doors and declare bankruptcy.32 FSIS announced on October 26, 2007 that the likely source of the contamination was beef trim that Topps had imported from Canadian Establishment Number 630, Ranchers Beef, Ltd. Of Balzac, Alberta that itself had shut down operations in August 2007.33

As part of the investigation, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported that there were 40 illnesses with 21 known hospitalizations in eight states. In Canada, the CFIA reported that there were 45 illnesses that seemed to be tied to meat produced by Ranchers Beef that included eleven hospitalizations and one death.34 After its initial announcement, CFIA was forced to issue six additional press releases that expanded the scope of the recall of meat that was produced at Ranchers Beef.35

It should be noted that FSIS never conducted an audit of Ranchers Beef, Ltd. FSIS officials indicated that Ranchers Beef was a new company that had come into existence in 2006 and that the agency did not have the opportunity to schedule it for an audit before it ceased operations in August 2007.36 Yet, the CFIA had certified the new company to export its products to the U.S. FSIS did not delist Ranchers Beef until October 20, 2007 –– some two months after it ceased operations.37

USDA officials admitted during an October 23, 2007 news teleconference that FSIS had not formally informed trading partners of the new FSIS policy of testing for beef trim that it had initiated for domestic beef plants in March 2007.38 Therefore, all countries that exported beef products to the United States between March 2007 and October 2007 were not in compliance with U.S. food safety standards.

In response to the findings of the Ranchers Beef investigation, FSIS announced that, effective November 9, 2007, it would institute increased testing of all imported meat and poultry products from Canada for E. coli 0157:H7, Salmonella, and Listeria monocytogenes.39 That enhanced testing regime ceased on November 28, 2007.




b. Aliki Foods Recall of Chicken and Pasta Product for Listeria Monocytogenes Contamination41

On October 9, 2007, FSIS announced a voluntary recall by Aliki Foods, Incorporated that had imported 70,400 pounds of chicken/broccoli fettuccine alfredo frozen dinners that had been possibly contaminated with Listeria monocytogenes. The product had been produced by Canadian Establishment Number 219, Otter Valley Foods Incorporated, located in Tillsonburg, Ontario. Discovery of the contamination came as result of FSIS microbiological testing at the import establishment.


D. The failure to delist Canada would be contrary to the FMIA, PPIA, as well as arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion, and thus contrary to the Administrative Procedures Act.

Given the overwhelming evidence that the country’s inspection system is not meeting requirements equivalent as those applicable to official establishments in the United States, including the admission of this in numerous agency audits, FSIS' failure to issue a rule delisting Canada under 9 C.F.R. §§ 327.2 (b) and 381.196 (b) would violate the FMIA, which states that “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all carcasses, parts of carcasses, meat, and meat food products of cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses, mules, or other equines, capable of use as human food, offered for importation into the United States shall be subject to the inspection, sanitary, quality, species verification, and residue standards applied to products produced in the United States.” 42 It would also violate the PPIA, which states that

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all poultry, or parts or products of poultry, capable of use as human food offered for importation into the United States shall ––
be subject to inspection, sanitary, quality, species verification, and residue standards that achieve a level of sanitary protection equivalent to that achieved under United States standards; and
have been processed in facilities and under conditions that achieve a level of sanitary protection equivalent to that achieved under United States standards.43

Additionally, in its 2005 audit report, the OIG found inconsistencies in the application of FSIS’ policy of establishment delistment. For example, FSIS moved to delist plants in Belgium and Australia because they were not subject to daily inspection, but failed to take the same action against Canada.44 In 2003, FSIS took the very strong step of suspending Argentina’s ability to certify plants that could export to the United States because “past audit findings revealed continuing problems with the implementation of U.S. inspection requirements in certified establishments in Argentina.” 45

Should FSIS continue to provide preferential treatment to Canada, and choose not to delist its without proper support or foundation, especially when it has had knowledge of the shortcomings of the Canadian inspection system at least back to 2003, such a decision would surely be arbitrary and capricious as well as an abuse of discretion.




ConclusionsThe Canadian food safety system has numerous deficiencies that have been discovered and documented by FSIS auditors in recent years. There have been major recalls involving imported Canadian meat and poultry products that have called into question the safety of those products imported into the United States. In spite of these findings, the FSIS continues to treat Canada deferentially.

Furthermore, we are extremely concerned that FSIS is entertaining a proposal by Canada that would seriously undermine the continuous inspection standard that has been the underpinning of U.S. meat and poultry safety law. It has become apparent that Canada’s less rigorous inspection policies have led to some of the recent incidents involving contaminated food entering into our food supply.

In light of these significant food safety issues, we respectfully request that FSIS immediately begin rulemaking to remove Canada as country that is eligible to export meat and poultry products under 9 C.F.R. §§ 327.2 (b) and 381.196 (b).


Sincerely,

Wenonah Hauter,
Executive Director
Food & Water Watch

Friday, November 7, 2008

Contaminated Pet Food Makes Humans Sick

Update: Recall of Dry Dog and Cat Food Products Associated with Human Salmonella Schwarzengrund Infections --- United States, 2008

On May 16, 2008, CDC reported on a 2006--2007 multistate outbreak of infection with Salmonella enterica serotype Schwarzengrund that was associated with dry dog food (1). At the time of that report, a total of 70 cases had been reported from 19 states, with the last case identified on October 1, 2007. Subsequently, an additional case was identified on December 29, 2007. Epidemiologic and environmental investigations have suggested the source of the outbreak was dry pet food produced by one manufacturer, Mars Petcare US. This report updates the previous CDC report, provides additional epidemiologic findings, and describes additional actions taken by public health agencies and the manufacturer. In 2008, eight more cases have been reported, bringing the total number of cases in the outbreak to 79. On September 12, 2008, the company announced a nationwide voluntary recall of all dry dog and cat food products produced during a 5-month period at one Pennsylvania plant.* Dry pet food has a 1-year shelf life. Contaminated products identified in recalls might still be in the homes of purchasers and could cause illness. Persons who have these products should not use them to feed their pets but should discard them or return them to the store.

During 2006--2007, CDC, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and multiple state health departments investigated reports to PulseNet† of persons infected with a strain of S. Schwarzengrund with an indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) pattern.§ A case was defined as a laboratory-confirmed infection with the outbreak strain of S. Schwarzengrund in a person residing in the United States who either had symptoms beginning on or after January 1, 2006, or (if the symptom onset date was unknown) had S. Schwarzengrund isolated from a specimen on or after January 1, 2006. Investigators initially identified 70 cases, mostly in children. As a result of these findings, on August 21, 2007, Mars Petcare US (referred to as manufacturer A in the May 16, 2008 report) announced voluntary recalls of selected sized bags of two brands of dry dog food, both manufactured by the company at its plant in Everson, Pennsylvania. The recall was based on microbiologic testing by FDA, which found unopened bags of the two brands contaminated with the outbreak strain. Other brands of dry dog and cat food produced at the same facility were not included in that recall. The Everson, Pennsylvania, facility ceased operations during July--November 2007 to enable cleaning, disinfection, and renovation, and resumed normal operations in mid-November 2007.

Despite the 2007 recall, the outbreak strain of S.Schwarzen-grund was isolated from eight more ill persons during January--October 2008 (Figure 1), bringing the total number of cases to 79 in 21 states (Figure 2). The ill persons were residents of Pennsylvania (three), Georgia (two), New York (two), and Texas (one). The last reported specimen collection date was September 18, 2008. The only connection between the ill persons was infection with the outbreak strain; they shared no household or family contacts.

Among the eight ill persons, five were female. Among the seven whose age was available, the median age was 8 months (range: 4 months--39 years); six persons were aged <2 years. Of five ill persons for whom clinical information was available, all five had visited a health-care professional, two had bloody diarrhea (no information on symptoms was available for the other three), and one had been hospitalized. No deaths were reported. Of six households with pet ownership known, all six had pets (i.e., dogs, cats, or both), but no illness was reported in any pet. Pets in three households were being fed a brand of dry pet food known to be produced at the Everson plant. Investigators collected seven dog stool specimens and two samples of dry dog food from the homes of two Pennsylvania patients. None of the stool specimens or dog food samples tested positive for Salmonella. Bag lot numbers and "best by" dates could not be examined in these households because the dog food had been poured into plastic containers and the bags discarded. Consequently, investigators could not be certain that the dog food from the two households had been produced at the Everson plant, and, if so, whether the dog food had been produced after the plant was reopened in November 2007 or earlier.

After additional outbreak-linked illnesses were identified in 2008, FDA conducted another investigation. In August 2008, FDA found the outbreak strain of S. Schwarzengrund in multiple brands of finished product at the plant, prompting another recall of products by Mars Petcare US. On September 12, the company announced a nationwide voluntary recall of all dry dog and cat food products produced at the Everson plant from February 18 to July 29, 2008, when production again was suspended at the plant. In addition, Mars Petcare US has taken steps to ensure that recalled products are no longer on store shelves. On October 1, the company announced that the Everson plant would be closed permanently. The FDA investigation is continuing.

Reported by: M Deasy, M Moll, MD, V Urdaneta, MD, S Ostroff, MD, Pennsylvania Dept of Health. E Villamil, MPH, P Smith, MD, New York State Dept of Health. PulseNet; C Barton Behravesh, DVM, IT Williams, PhD, Div of Foodborne, Bacterial, and Mycotic Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases, CDC.

Editorial Note:

This outbreak of human Salmonella Schwarzengrund infections has continued over a 3-year period, likely because of continued contamination in the Everson, Pennsylvania, pet food production facility. S. Schwarzengrund is a rare serotype of Salmonella. Although the outbreak PFGE pattern is the most common S. Schwarzengrund PFGE pattern in the PulseNet database, isolates with that pattern made up only 20 (4%) of the 498 S. Schwarzengrund isolates from humans submitted to PulseNet during 1999--2005, suggesting that the illnesses described in this report resulted from a common source.

Considering the wide distribution of these products and the relatively small number of cases, the attack rate for this outbreak appears to be low. However, only an estimated 3% of all Salmonella infections in the United States are laboratory confirmed and reported to surveillance systems (2). A low attack rate supports the hypothesis that infection might have resulted from practices in a limited number of households that brought humans into contact with the contaminated pet food and led to amplification of the organisms (e.g., cross-contamination in the kitchens or irregular cleaning of pet food bowls that might promote bacteria growth). In addition, the strain might primarily affect persons (e.g., young children) who are more susceptible to lower infective doses.

This outbreak is the first documented outbreak to associate human Salmonella infections with contaminated dry dog food and to trace human illness to a contaminated pet food plant. The original source of contamination and mechanisms for continued contamination in the Everson plant over a 3-year period are unknown. The absence of cases during January--March 2008 suggests that cleaning and disinfection of the plant might have had some effect. FDA is working with Mars Petcare US to better understand this problem.

Since 2006, at least 13 recall announcements involving 135 pet products (e.g., dry dog food and cat food, pet treats, raw diets, and pet supplements) have been issued because of Salmonella contamination.¶ These recalls have resulted from contamination with multiple serotypes of Salmonella and have been associated with multiple pet food manufacturing plants in the United States. Pet products typically are recalled after product testing indicates contamination with Salmonella. To date, no human illness has been associated with these other pet food recalls.

Although the last reported case in this outbreak was tested on September 18, 2008, additional cases might occur. The September 2008 recall involved approximately 23,109 tons of dry pet foods, representing 105 brands. However, dry pet food has a 1-year shelf life, and contaminated product might still be in the homes of purchasers and could produce illness.

State and local health departments that identify ill persons with the outbreak strain should query ill persons or their caregivers to find out about pet-related exposures, including brands of dry pet food used in the home. When possible, pet stool specimens and samples of dry pet food should be collected and submitted for laboratory testing. Hypothesis-generating interviews for enteric infections should routinely include questions on contact with pets and other animals, pet food, pet treats, and pet supplements.

Consumers and health departments should be aware that all dry pet food, pet treats (3), and pet supplements (4) might be contaminated with pathogens such as Salmonella, and consumers should use precautions with all brands of dry pet food, treats, and supplements. In contrast, canned pet food is unlikely to be contaminated with such pathogens because the manufacturing process should eliminate bacterial contamination. To prevent Salmonella infections, persons should wash their hands for at least 20 seconds with warm water and soap immediately after handling dry pet foods, pet treats, and pet supplements, and especially before preparing and eating food for humans. Infants should be kept away from pet feeding areas. Children aged <5 years should not be allowed to touch or eat dry pet food, treats, or supplements.

In addition to transmission of Salmonella from contact with dry pet food, humans can acquire Salmonella infection from contact with the feces of animals that acquired Salmonella infection from contaminated dry pet food or other sources. Effective hand washing after handling pets and animal feces will prevent such infections. Persons who suspect that contact with dry pet food or pets has caused illness should consult their health-care providers. Additional information on the transmission of Salmonella from pets to humans is available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthypets/diseases/salmonellosis.htm.

References

CDC. Multistate outbreak of human Salmonella infections caused by contaminated dry dog food---United States, 2006--2007. MMWR 2008;57:521--4.
Voetsch AC, Van Gilder TJ, Angulo FJ, et al. FoodNet estimate of the burden of illness caused by nontyphoidal Salmonella infections in the United States. Clin Infect Dis 2004;38:S127--34.
CDC. Human salmonellosis associated with animal-derived pet treats---United States and Canada, 2005. MMWR 2006;55:702--5.
Food and Drug Administration. The Hartz Mountain Corporation recalls Vitamin Care for Cats because of possible health risk. Rockville, MD: Food and Drug Administration; 2007. Available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/firmrecalls/hartz10_07.html.


* The list of recalled products is available at http://petcare.mars.com/othernewsreleases.html.

† The national molecular subtyping network for foodborne disease surveillance.

§ XbaI pattern JM6X01.0015.

¶ Available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/petfoodrecall.

Thursday, November 6, 2008

FDA Drinks KoolAid & We Bite the Bullet

I know this is a USDA "dirty dealings" blog but I am posting as regards also the FDA because they are twin brothers of different mothers and are therefore related to each other by close design. Both are bloated, self-serving govt entities propelled by special interest who operate by deceptive practices & secrecy. Its not so much what these entites are telling us that counts, its what they are not telling us that should be our main concern.

See article below from Dr. Jon;

-------------------

Abraham Lincoln once famously said that you can't fool all of the people all of the time. But, believe me, good marketing can fool an awful lot of them.

Case in point, federal government statistics are showing that about one in four American teen girls has now been vaccinated against human papillomavirus (HPV), which causes about 70 percent of cervical cancers

I get it – I really do. The vaccine, Gardasil, has been marketed so aggressively that parents are being made to feel like they are sentencing their kids to cancer if they don't get the vaccine. The FDA was complicit in creating this hysteria, rushing the approval through in six months (it normally can take up to three years to get a vaccine approved).

The FDA is still drinking the Kool-Aid, saying it had hoped for even higher vaccination rates. But you know who's still not drinking the Kool-Aid on Gardasil? Me.

Gardasil has unleased a storm of side effects that no one seems to be taking seriously. Women have died after receiving this vaccine, and it has been linked to other frightening medical episodes, such as seizures.

Meanwhile, before the vaccine was rushed to market, a comprehensive system of Pap smear screening in Western countries had already significantly reduced cervical cancer deaths.

In short, Gardasil is no silver bullet. It's just a regular, plain ol' bullet – capable of doing plenty of damage. The rush to widespread use of this new vaccine has been facilitated by an overly enthusiastic set of health care professionals, including doctors on drug company payrolls, whose authority allows them to prey on the ignorance and lack of training of politicians, journalists and vulnerable members of the lay public.

As the ancient Romans liked to say, "festina lente" (make haste slowly).

Thursday, October 16, 2008

FDA Bans Brains & Spinal Cords from Petfood

It is well to remember that the nasty little mal-formed pirons that are generally concentrated in the brains and spinal cords of infected animals,---have also been known to show up in the meat and muscle of some of them. Therefore, banning these parts from the food chain ALONE is NOT enough: studies show its in the meat of the animals too!

(NaturalNews)

Effective April 23, 2009, the FDA has banned a series of
cattle products from all animal feed and pet food in attempt to
prevent the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also
known as mad cow disease.

BSE is a fatal, degenerative disease of the brain cause by defective
proteins known as prions. These prions can be acquired by consuming
the flesh of infected animals and lead to a similarly fatal human
version of the disease, known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease.

Federal regulations already prohibit using ruminant protein as part of
the feed given to other ruminants. These measures were instituted in
the United States and Canada in 1997, after a mad cow outbreak in the
United Kingdom.

--
Click on title above for full story:
http://www.naturalnews.com/024489.html

STAPLES supports this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88kMJXphN0k

Sunday, October 12, 2008

EU Dining on USA EEE Infected Equines?

October 10, 2008

Two Texas Horses Test Positive for EEE;
Horses Need Protection Against Mosquito-Borne Diseases

Texas has joined at least five other states this year in reporting cases of Eastern Equine Encephalitis infection in horses. In Houston County, in the southeast corner of the state, a horse with clinical illness has tested positive for the disease, and in the north central Texas, in Denton County, a vaccinated horse also tested positive and exhibited clinical signs of disease. EEE, which can be transmitted to humans by infected mosquitoes, also has been reported this year in horses in Georgia, Florida, Maine, Tennessee, and New Hampshire­and in Ontario, Canada.

"Infected horses are a `sentinel´ or warning that infected mosquitoes are in the area, and measures should be taken to protect humans against exposure to the dangerous pests," said Dr. Andy Schwartz, state epidemiologist for the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), the state´s livestock and poultry health regulatory agency. "Protect yourself and your horses with a mosquito spray containing DEET, get rid of stagnant water, and avoid being outside at night, when mosquitoes are more active."

"Horses with mosquito-borne encephalitic viruses, such as EEE, Western Equine Encephalitis (WEE) or West Nile Virus (WNV), may stagger, appear confused, and act erratically. Owners should contact their veterinarian immediately, if their equine animals exhibit clinical signs of these diseases. About half of infected animals may be saved, with the appropriate supportive care," said Dr. Schwartz. Although EEE, WEE and WNV are not regulatory diseases, they are reportable to the TAHC and to the Texas Department of State Health Services, due to their potential to cause human disease.

"Vaccines are readily available to protect equine animals against mosquito-borne encephalitic diseases, but they must be given according to the manufacturer´ s" directions, and it takes at least a week to 10 days after vaccination for protective antibodies to develop. Booster shots also must be given as needed. Heed your veterinarian´ s advice," he said. "As good as vaccines are at protecting against infection, there are rare times when a vaccinated animal will still contract disease. That is no reason to avoid vaccinating your animals."

Dr. Schwartz noted that, in 2002, when West Nile Virus was first detected in Texas, 1,699 equine animals were stricken with infection. West Nile vaccine has helped cut those case numbers from 716 in 2003 to only two cases in 2008. "Vaccinating against mosquito-borne diseases has to be a part of routine equine health care," he said. "Don´t stop, just because case numbers drop."

Thursday, October 9, 2008

Mad Cows & Computer Models: Study Shows USA Response to BSE Inadequate

New studies show USDA relies on flawed "computer models" to judge risk factors of BSE;

Monday, June 16, 2008
Mad Cows and Computer Models: The U.S. Response to BSE
NEW SOLUTIONS: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy

Issue: Volume 18, Number 2 / 2008 Pages: 145 - 156

Mad Cows and Computer Models: The U.S. Response to BSE

Frank Ackerman and Wendy A. Johnecheck

Abstract:

The proportion of slaughtered cattle tested for BSE is much smaller in the U.S. than in Europe and Japan, leaving the U.S. heavily dependent on statistical models to estimate both the current prevalence and the spread of BSE. We examine the models relied on by USDA, finding that the prevalence model provides only a rough estimate, due to limited data availability. Reassuring forecasts from the model of the spread of BSE depend on the arbitrary constraint that worst-case values are assumed by only one of 17 key parameters at a time. In three of the six published scenarios with multiple worst-case parameter values, there is at least a 25% probability that BSE will spread rapidly. In public policy terms, reliance on potentially flawed models can be seen as a gamble that no serious BSE outbreak will occur. Statistical modeling at this level of abstraction, with its myriad, compound uncertainties, is no substitute for precautionary policies to protect public health against the threat of epidemics such as BSE.

http://baywood.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,5,18;journal,1,41;linkingpublicationresults,1:300327,1

Click on title above to read full article;

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/mad-cows-and-computer-models-us.html