Swine Flu Update

CDC can keep calling it H1N1 (as requested by the "pork growers) but I am sticking to calling it what it is as indicated above

INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (H1N1) (36): WHO UPDATE & SEASONAL
*****************************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: Fri 28 May 2010
Source: WHO Global Alert and Response (GAR) Disease Outbreak News
[summ. & edited]



Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 102
---------------------------------
As of 23 May, worldwide more than 214 countries and overseas
territories or communities have reported laboratory confirmed cases of
pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009, including over 18 114 deaths. WHO is
actively monitoring the progress of the pandemic through frequent
consultations with the WHO Regional Offices and Member States and
through monitoring of multiple sources of information.

Situation update
----------------
The most active areas of pandemic influenza virus transmission
currently are in parts of the Caribbean and Southeast Asia, where low
level circulation is occurring. Except for localized areas of pandemic
influenza activity in parts of Chile, there is little evidence of
pandemic influenza activity in the temperate zone of the southern
hemisphere.

RSV
---
Of note, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) is widely circulating in
South America resulting in an increase in respiratory disease
activity, complicating somewhat the interpretation of syndromic
surveillance data from the area. RSV primarily affects children under
the age of 5 years.

Seasonal influenza
------------------
Seasonal influenza A viruses continue to be detected at low to
sporadic levels in all regions. Influenza B has been reported in
increasing but low numbers in South America, where it only recently
appeared, while it is decreasing in Asia.

In the Caribbean and Central America, Cuba, and to a much lesser
extent Costa Rica, continue to experience active circulation of
pandemic influenza virus. In Cuba, current pandemic influenza
activity, which began during late February 2010, remains unchanged
since reaching a plateau during mid-April 2010; in addition, over the
past month, there have been sporadic detections of seasonal influenza
B viruses and also evidence of co-circulation of other respiratory
viruses. In Costa Rica, sustained low levels of pandemic influenza
virus have been co-circulating with other respiratory viruses since
the beginning of 2010. Several other countries in the region continue
to report sporadic detections of seasonal influenza B viruses and low
level co-circulation of other respiratory viruses.

In the tropical zone of South America, pandemic and seasonal influenza
viruses continued to circulate at low to sporadic levels. In Peru,
recent regional increases in respiratory diseases activity (in
children under age 5) has been largely associated with circulating
respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). In Colombia and Brazil, low levels
of pandemic and seasonal influenza H3N2 viruses have been detected
over the past month. In Bolivia, a recent period of circulation of
predominantly seasonal influenza type B viruses appears to have
concluded.

In Asia, overall pandemic influenza activity remains low to sporadic,
except in limited areas of south and southeast Asia, particularly
Singapore, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. In Singapore, levels of ARI
[acute respiratory infection] have been elevated since April 2010 and
in recent weeks have remained near epidemic threshold; approximately
39 percent of respiratory specimens from ILI [influenza-like illness]
patients tested positive for pandemic influenza virus during mid May
2010. In neighboring Malaysia, limited data suggest that active
pandemic influenza virus circulation persist after recent activity
peaked during mid April 2010; small numbers of fatal cases have been
reported since that time. In Bangladesh, co-dominant circulation of
pandemic and seasonal influenza B viruses has been observed since mid
April 2010, however, the overall intensity of respiratory diseases was
reported to low during this period. Low levels of pandemic influenza
virus continued to circulate in western India, while low and declining
levels of seasonal influenza B viruses continued to be reported across
East Asia.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, limited data from several countries continues
to suggest that active transmission of pandemic influenza virus in
West Africa has now largely subsided. In addition to the persistence
of low level circulation of pandemic influenza virus in Ghana,
sporadic detections of pandemic influenza virus have been reported
during the past month in Cameroon, Angola, and Rwanda. In Cameroon,
there has been persistent active circulation of seasonal influenza B
viruses since mid-March 2010.

In the temperate regions of the northern and southern hemisphere,
overall pandemic influenza activity remains low to sporadic. In the
southern hemisphere, Chile continues to report increased ILI in
several regions of the country (notably Los Lagos), however, the
increase in respiratory disease activity has been predominantly
associated with circulating RSV and only to a much lesser extent
pandemic influenza virus.

Viruses other than influenza
----------------------------
In neighboring Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, all recent
respiratory diseases activity during the past month has been
associated with viruses other than influenza. Similarly, there have
been no recent detections of influenza virus in South Africa. In New
Zealand and Australia, overall levels of ILI remain low; only sporadic
detections of seasonal influenza H3N2 and pandemic influenza viruses
have been recently reported in Australia.

The Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) continues monitoring
the global circulation of influenza viruses, including pandemic,
seasonal, and other influenza viruses infecting, or with the potential
to infect, humans including seasonal influenza. For more information
on virological surveillance and antiviral resistance, see the full
text of the weekly virology update at the URL above.

Oseltamivir resistance
----------------------
As of 12 May 2010, 4 additional cases of oseltamivir resistant
pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 viruses have been reported. It brings
the cumulative total to 289 so far. All but one of these have the
H275Y substitution and are assumed to remain sensitive to zanamivir.

No countries and overseas territories/communities have newly reported
their 1st pandemic (H1N1) 2009 confirmed cases since the last web
update (no. 101).

Region / Deaths*
WHO Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) / 168
WHO Regional Office for the Americas (AMRO) / At least 8401
WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO)** / 1019
WHO Regional Office for Europe (EURO) / At least 4878
WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia (SEARO) / 1814
WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific (WPRO) / 1834
Total* / At least 18114

*The reported number of fatal cases is an under representation of the
actual numbers as many deaths are never tested or recognized as
influenza related.
** No update since 7 March 2010

Since the last update on 16 May the number of fatalities has increased
by at least 17.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail Rapporteur Marianne Hopp

[The most active areas of pandemic influenza virus transmission
currently are in parts of the Caribbean and Southeast Asia
(particularly Singapore, Malaysia, and Bangladesh), where low level
circulation is occurring. Elsewhere influenza activity remains low to
sporadic, and respiratory syncytial virus and other co-circulating
respiratory viruses predominate in the tropical zone of South America.

A map of influenza activity and virus subtypes is accessible at
.
The displayed data reflect the most recent data reported to Flunet
(), WHO regional
offices, or on ministry of health websites in the preceding 2 weeks.
The full text of the WHO update should be consulted for other relevant
links. - Mod.CP]

[see also:
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (35): Singapore 20100530.1795
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (34): Indian variants 20100525.1741
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (33): WHO update, corr. 20100527.1765
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (33): WHO update 20100522.1700
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (32): WHO update 20100501.1418
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (31): UK (Scotland) D222G mut 20100422.1310
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (30): WHO update 20100417.1250
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (29): seasonal vaccine 20100415.1224
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (28): Hong Kong SAR, Norway, D222G mutation
20100409.1147
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (27): USA (GA) 20100330.1004
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (26): WHO update 20100327.0965
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (25): oseltamivir resistance 20100326.0961
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (24): mutation analysis 20100313.0820
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (23): WHO Update 20100313.0805
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (22): Canada (SK), reassortment 20100305.0734
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (21): Norway, D222G mutation 20100305.0729
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (20): China, update 20100303.0702
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (19): reassortment 20100302.0689 2009
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (18): WHO update 20100221.0587
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (17): WHO Update 20100216.0546
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (16): myocarditis in children 20100215.0526
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (15): update 20100214.0522
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (14): Finland, cross-reacting antibody 20100205.0392
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (13): vaccine recall 20100204.0379
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (12): vaccine distribution, WHO update 20100202.0359
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (11): WHO statement to CE, corr. 20100129.0312
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (11): WHO statement to CE 20100126.0289
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (10): PAHO update 20100121.0240
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (09): WHO update 20100119.0221
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (08): USA (vaccine safety), Mongolia 20100117.0194
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (07): China, travel alert 20100115.0180
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (06): USA (SD) Native Americans 20100114.0160
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (05): vaccine update 20100112.0143
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (04): Australia (WA), i/v zanamivir 20100111.0127
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (03): USA (WI) minorities 20100109.0103
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (02): PAHO update 20100108.0093
Influenza pandemic (H1N1) (01): China, 2009 20100105.0040]
........................................cp/mj/jw
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VESICULAR STOMATITIS, EQUINE - USA: (ARIZONA)

*********************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: 28 May 2010
Source: Arizona Department of Agriculture press release [edited]



Vesicular Stomatitis Virus Found In Horses in Arizona
-----------------------------------------------------
The Arizona Department of Agriculture has confirmed Vesicular
Stomatitis Virus (VSV) in horses on a premises in Cochise County. The
case-positive premises where VSV was discovered has been quarantined.
This disease causes blister-like lesions to form in the mouth and on
the dental pad, tongue, lips, nostrils, hooves, and teats. These
blisters swell and break, leaving raw tissue that is so painful that
infected animals generally refuse to eat or drink and show signs of
lameness. Severe weight loss usually follows, and in dairy cows, a
severe drop in milk production commonly occurs. Affected dairy cattle
can appear to be normal and will continue to eat about half of their
feed intake.

Why is this important?

While vesicular stomatitis can cause economic losses to livestock
producers, it is a particularly significant disease because its
outward signs are similar to (although generally less severe than)
those of foot-and-mouth disease, a foreign animal disease of
cloven-hoofed animals that was eradicated from the United States in
1929. The clinical signs of vesicular stomatitis are also similar to
those of swine vesicular disease, another foreign animal disease. The
only way to tell these diseases apart is through laboratory tests.

Can humans "get it?"

Humans can also become infected with vesicular stomatitis when
handling affected animals. However, we have no human cases to report.

Which animals are most susceptible?

Horses, swine and cattle are most at risk. However, other animals may
also contract the disease.

Has this disease been found in the U.S. before?

Last year [2009] Texas and New Mexico had a few cases of VSV. This
year Arizona is the 1st state to detect the disease, which occurs
sporadically on 5 to 8 year cycles.

Why is this occurring now?

Vesicular stomatitis is most likely to occur during warm months in
the Southwest, particularly along riverways and in valleys. Arizona
last had confirmed cases of VSV in the spring of 2005.

How is this disease handled?

The following actions have been recommended to the owners of the horses:
. This report was primarily compiled from
.

- Separate animals with lesions from healthy animals, preferably by
stabling. Animals on pastures apparently are affected more frequently
with this disease.

- As a precautionary measure, do not move animals from premises
affected by vesicular stomatitis for at least 30 days after the last
lesion found has healed.

- Implement on-farm insect control programs that include the
elimination or reduction of insect breeding areas and the use of
insecticide sprays or insecticide-treated eartags on animals.

- Use protective measures when handling affected animals to avoid
human exposure to this disease.

What if a viewer/reader suspects they have animal(s) with this problem?

They should immediately contact their veterinarian or the State
Veterinarian's office.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


[Vesicular stomatitis virus is one of those interesting diseases that
emerges every once in a while without much warning until it bursts
uninvited into our livestock population. It does not occur every
year, but in the past several years it has been almost yearly.

The problem with vesicular stomatitis is twofold. One, there is
inevitably a disruption of production in cattle; not only will the
sick animal produce less, but disease management tactics must be
very stringent. The 2nd problem is that the clinical signs are
similar to that of foot and mouth disease (FMD), with which it can
easily be confused (though horses are resistant to FMD and
susceptible to VS).

In this case, the diagnosis of the disease in an equine 1st
forestalls any worry about FMD, until an animal susceptible to FMD,
such as a bovine, appears with similar clinical signs. Consequently,
surveillance must be ever vigilant.

VS can be transmitted by contamination by transcutaneous or
transmucosal route and by arthropod transmission (_Phlebotomus_, and
_Aedes_, etc.). Incubation of the disease may be as long as 21 days.

According to the OIE, clinical signs can be summarized as follows:

- excessive salivation

- blanched raised or broken vesicles of various sizes in the mouth:

Horses: upper surface of the tongue, surface of the lips and around
nostrils, corners of the mouth and the gums

Cattle: tongue, lips, gums, hard palate, and sometimes muzzle and
around the nostrils

Pigs: snout:

- Lesions involving feet of horses and cattle are not exceptional

- Teat lesions occur in dairy herds

- Foot lesions and lameness are frequent in pigs

- Recovery in around 2 weeks

- Complication: loss of production and mastitis in dairy herds due
to secondary infections, lameness in horses

There are 2 major serotypes: New Jersey, and Indiana. We would like
to know which of the 2 strains this one is.

Portions of this comment have been extracted from:
- Mod.TG]

[The interactive HealthMap/ProMED map for Arizona is available at:
- CopyEd.EJP]

[see also:
2009
----
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - USA (03): (NM) 20090623.2294
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - USA (02): (TX) 20090616.2230
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - USA: (TX) 20090613.2188
2007
----
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - Belize (Cayo): OIE 20070319.0967
2006
----
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - USA (WY)(02): OIE 20060825.2395
Vesicular stomatitis, equine - USA (WY) 20060818.2314]
....................tg/ejp/lm

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ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
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thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
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or archived material.
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BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS, BOVINE - USA (04): (KENTUCKY)

[see also:
I am not sure why Tam included
Tuberculosis, XXDR - USA: FL ex Peru 20091230.4387 but I left it.

Maria
===

Bovine tuberculosis - USA: (KY)

BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS - USA: (KENTUCKY)
*************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: Wed 26 May 2010
Source: CNBC, Associated Press (AP) report [edited]



Two beef cattle in Kentucky have tested positive for bovine
tuberculosis, and state veterinarian Robert Stout says results are
pending on a 3rd animal.

Stout said [Wed 26 May 2010] that the 2 infected cows were in a
Fleming County herd in northern Kentucky, but he said the 3 animals
didn't enter the food supply.

He said the disease was discovered when a cow from the farm was
slaughtered in Pennsylvania and tested positive. Stout said the rest
of the herd was tested, and 2 other cattle were suspected of having
the disease. One tested positive for the disease.

Stout said Kentucky has been classified as free of bovine
tuberculosis since 1987. He said that status would likely not change
if no other animals test positive in the next 6 months.

Bovine tuberculosis causes severe coughing, fatigue, emaciation, and
debilitation in cattle and results in reduced milk and meat
production.

Humans can catch the disease from contact with infected cattle, but
that's rare.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail


[Bovine tuberculosis (TB) is caused by _Mycobacterium bovis_. While
there are other _Mycobacterium_ spp, _M. bovis_ and _M. tuberculosis_
are among the most important, as these tend to move between animals
and people.

Disease caused by mycobacteria often develop very slowly and may take
months to years to develop. These bacteria grow very slowly and only
replicate every 12-20 hours. While the pathogenic species (those
which can cause disease) such as _M. tuberculosis_ and _M. bovis_ can
infect a human or an animal, often the individual does not know that
he has been infected. In humans, those infected but without active
disease can be treated to prevent disease from occurring. To prevent
other animals from being infected, a diseased animal must be culled
from the herd.

The disease primarily affects the respiratory tract but can also
spread to other parts of the body. The primary route of transmission
is the exchange of respiratory secretions between infected and
uninfected animals. This can be achieved through nose-to-nose contact
or by the inhalation of aerosol droplets that have been exhaled by an
infected animal. Animals may also become infected with _M. bovis_ by
ingesting the bacteria. This could occur by ingesting feeds that have
been contaminated with _M. bovis_ by other infected animals.
Carnivores may become infected with bovine TB by eating infected
carcasses.

Various factors affect the efficiency in which _M. bovis_ is spread
within a cattle herd. The number of infected animals shedding the
organism, as well as the number of susceptible animals present within
a herd can have an impact on the transmission of the bacteria. For
example, the more animals within a herd that are shedding _M. bovis_,
the greater the chance of an uninfected animal coming into contact
with an infected animal. The animal density of a herd also influences
the efficiency of _M. bovis_ transmission. Transmission of _M. bovis_
among animals housed in confinement facilities may be greater because
of close contact. Cattle infected with bovine TB may shed bacteria in
their feces, urine and milk, but these are felt to be a minor source
of bacterial transmission.

Environmental contamination with _M. bovis_ may play a role in the
spread of bovine TB. Survival of _M. bovis_ in the environment is
primarily affected by exposure to sunlight. Reports on the length of
survival of _M. bovis_ vary from 18-332 days at temperatures ranging
from 54-75 deg F (12-24 deg C). Under laboratory conditions, _M.
bovis_ has been isolated for up to 8 weeks from various feeds kept at
75 deg F (24 deg C) and 14 weeks from various feeds kept at 32 deg F
(0 deg C). However, under field conditions, it is difficult to
isolate _M. bovis_ from pastures grazed by animals known to be
infected with bovine TB.

Kentucky will be tracing all animals having moved into the herd of
origin (trace-ins) as well all animals that have moved out of the
herd of origin (trace-outs). If they find more animals that are not
related to this herd, there free status may be in jeopardy.

Portions of this comment have been extracted from
.
- Mod.TG]

[The state of Kentucky in the East Central US can be located on the
HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map at
.
Fleming County can be located on the map at
. - Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]

[see also:
Bovine tuberculosis, cervid - USA: (MI) 20100418.1265
Bovine tuberculosis, bovine - USA (03): (NE) 20100409.1144
Bovine tuberculosis, bovine - USA (02): (MI) 20100325.0948
Bovine tuberculosis, bovine - USA: (SD) 20100107.0065
2009
----
Tuberculosis, XXDR - USA: FL ex Peru 20091230.4387
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (12): (MN), cervid 20091222.4315
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (11): (IN) cervid 20090804.2742
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (10): (IN) cervid, bovine 20090714.2508
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (09): (IN) cervid, bovine 20090711.2480
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (08): (IN) cervid, bovine 20090628.2343
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (07): (MN) cervid 20090625.2307
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (06) (NE) (02) 20090620.2270
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (05): (NE) 20090613.2198
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (04): (TX) conf. 20090613.2195
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (03): (NE) cattle, elk 20090603.2060
Bovine tuberculosis - USA (02): (ND) 20090514.1811
Bovine tuberculosis - USA: (TX), susp 20090423.1536
Tuberculosis, captive wildlife - USA: (NE) 20090414.1423
Tuberculosis, hospital exposures - USA: (IL) susp. 20090412.1398]
...................................sb/tg/mj/lm
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ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
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information, and of any statements or opinions based
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BRUCELLOSIS, BOVINE - CANADA (02): (BRITISH COLUMBIA), CLARIFICATION

********************************************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: 28 Jun 2010
From: Maria Koller

The following important points of correction and clarification are
being provided in relation to the subject posting.

Brucellosis has NOT been detected in the 3 BC-origin cows that were
slaughtered in the US, nor in the 2 cattle herds in southern BC from
which these 3 cows originated. At this time, brucellosis is suspected
but it is NOT detected or confirmed.

The 2 slaughtered cows were classified as reactors on serological
tests for brucellosis, meaning their status is brucellosis-suspect.
The remaining serum samples from these cows (no tissue samples were
taken) have been sent to the World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE) reference laboratory for brucellosis which is located in the
Canadian Food Inspection Agency's (CFIA) laboratory in Ottawa. Here,
additional laboratory investigations are being carried out on these
samples in order to further characterize the nature and cause of the
serological test results obtained in the US.

The 2 herds from which the 3 suspect cows originated are quarantined
while further investigations, including whole herd tests, are carried
out in these herds. The purpose of these investigations is to
ascertain the true infection status of these herds 'and to establish
the absence or presence of brucellosis. An essential element of these
investigations is a thorough examination of all possible routes by
which these herds could have been exposed to _Brucella abortus_,
including all trace-ins to these herds. Cattle removed from the herds
(trace-outs) are being identified.

These 2 cattle herds are located very close to one another in
southern BC and at a considerable distance from any known reservoirs
of _B. abortus_ infection; and at an even greater distance from known
reservoirs of _Brucella. suis_ infection (which could cause the
observed reactions). Canada has not practiced vaccination for
brucellosis for more than a decade; and import controls are in place
to prevent the introduction of the disease from other countries.

Although the last confirmed case of brucellosis in cattle in Canada
occurred more than 20 years ago, Canada has maintained a high level
of vigilance for this disease. Robust surveillance programs for
brucellosis have remained in place. These programs detect a small
number of brucellosis suspect reactor cattle, not unlike these three
cows, each year. Every finding of a suspect reactor under these
programs has triggered a comprehensive trace-back investigation of
all herds associated with the reactor animal, similar to the
investigations being undertaken for these three reactor cows. Since
1989, each and every one of these investigations has confirmed the
absence of brucellosis infection in these herds and in Canadian
livestock.

The investigations into these 3 suspect reactor cows are being
undertaken with the same diligence and thoroughness as is employed
for all suspect brucellosis investigations in Canada. The laboratory
tests and field investigations that are required to definitively
answer the question "has brucellosis been found in Canada?" are being
carried out as expeditiously as possible. I would be pleased to
provide an update once we have the answer.

--
Maria A. B. Koller-Jones, D.V.M.
Senior Staff Veterinarian
Animal Health Directorate
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
1400 Merivale Road, Ottawa, ON, K1A 0Y9

Government of Canada



[ProMED-mail is grateful for Dr. Koller-Jones providing this timely
and thorough correction to the media report cited in our last post.
Also we would gratefully appreciate the update that she has offered
to provide. - Mod.TG]

[see also:
Brucellosis, bovine - Canada: (BC) 20100528.1769]

..................tg/lm
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USDA Issues Pre-Harvest Management Controls & Intervention Options for Reducing Ecoli Shedding in Cattle

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Reducing_Ecoli_Shedding_In_Cattle_0510.pdf

The 5th Plague: Mock Ag-Bioterrorism Attack Conference

Case Western Reserve University Law School terrorism bioterrorism emergency response biosecurity cox international center

Presented by: Frederick K. Cox International Law Center
Cosponsored by: Institute for Global Security Law and Policy
The Law-Medicine Center


Summary: The Fifth Plague is a unique simulation-based bioterrorism conference. Participants, who include local, state, national and international officials, will be asked to "role play" their response to an agricultural-based attack. Issues that will be addressed include: legal questions of authority and powers of various agencies; cooperation among different branches of the government and between the U.S. and Canada; and responses to an actual attack. Attorneys who attend the event will learn about the law and procedures related to responding to a terrorist crisis in Ohio, specifically involving the food supply, enabling them to advise clients in the agriculture and transportation sectors and to prepare for potential litigation in this area.

Category: Education
Tags:zootonic diseases, agriculture, bioterrorism, world health, national security


Pt.1; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fnijoZrYX9g&feature=channel

Pt.2; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBrooscAreg

Pt. 3; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qr1DNNSUmHw

USDA "Casting" for Answers for Sustainable Ag - Invites US to Join in the Fray

Sustaining Animal Agriculture: Balancing Bioethical, Economic, and Social Issues

Where:Jefferson Auditorium
South Agriculture Building
1400 Independence Ave. SW
Washington, DC 20250-3700



When:
June 08, 2010 at noon
-to-
June 10, 2010 at 3:00 PM


The Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST), in cooperation with the USDA, is hosting a symposium of more than 30 speakers and panelists to address the impacts of regulations on food-animal agriculture at all levels and analyze the intended and unintended consequences of those regulations. This free symposium will be held in Washington, D.C., June 8-10, 2010. Don't miss out on this opportunity to hear the critical issues and get involved!

Symposium speakers and panelists will focus on several critical issues, including
Integration of Competing Concepts Surrounding the Ethical Use of Food Animals
Bioethical and Animal Welfare Issues
Long-term Survival and Food Security
Analysis of Certification and Regulatory Programs
Societal and Global Impacts
Consequences of Decisions by Consumers and Government Decision Makers
The symposium is free, but seating is limited and registration is highly recommended. Even if you are only able to attend part of the symposium, we encourage pre-registration for your convenience to get through the security and registration process as quickly as possible. On-site registration will also be available.

Click on the Register Now! link below to view the event homepage where you can pre-register and get a detailed agenda including speakers, dates, and times of each topic.

Register Now!

If you should have any questions about the event, sponsorship, or registration, please contact CAST at msly@cast-science.org or (515) 292-2125.

Thank you for your attention and response. We look forward to seeing you at this event.

Sincerely,
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology
msly@cast-science.org
515 292 2125